

A

V I N D I C A T I O N

O F

M R R A N D O L P H ' s

R E S I G N A T I O N.

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PHILADELPHIA:

PRINTED BY SAMUEL H. SMITH,  
NO. 118, CHESNUT STREET.

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M.DCC.XCV.

Nº. 116.

*District of Pennsylvania, to wit.*



BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the ninth day of November, in the twentieth year of the Independence of the United States of America, SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, of the said District, hath deposited in this Office the title of a book the right whereof he claims as Proprietor in the words following to wit:

"A vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation."

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, intituled "An Act for the encouragement of learning by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned."

SAM: CALDWELL, Clerk of the District of

Pennsylvania.

THE reader is desired to correct the following inaccuracies which occur in a few copies.

In page 8, lines 6 and 7 from the bottom, read thus, "affair  
" shall continue in secrecy under your injunction. For, after  
" pledging myself for a more specific investigation of all these  
" suggestions, I here, &c."

Page 34, line 6 from the top, for *apparent* read *abhorrent*.  
\_\_\_\_\_, line 9 from the bottom, read *the* \_\_\_\_\_ *article*, instead  
of *the article*.

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. Randolph to the Printer.*

" You will be pleased to direct any person, who chooses to  
" consult the French or other originals to my friend John R.  
" Smith, Esq. in whose hands they will be left."



## S T A T E M E N T

O F

## F A C T S, &c.

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ON Wednesday, the 19th of August 1795, I was going to the President's, as usual, at 9 o'clock in the morning; when his steward, Mr. Kidd, came to me at Mr. Rawle's in Market-street; and informed me, that the President desired me to postpone my visit, until half after ten. I supposed at first, that he might wish to have the latest hour for writing by the Southern mail of that day, or perhaps to ride out. But, as I was desirous of asking him a short question, which would determine me as to the manner of executing a piece of business, to be carried to him that morning; I inquired of Mr. Kidd, if he was then occupied with any particular person? and I was answered, that the President was every moment expecting some gentlemen. Accordingly I turned to the office; and at the appointed hour called at the President's. I desired the servant, who attended at the door, to tell the President, that I was come. But upon being informed, that Mr. Wolcott and Colonel Pickering had been there for some time, I went up stairs: and began to think, that the steward had committed a mistake. I supposed, that a consultation with the heads of departments had been intended to be held by the President earlier in the day, and that it might be proper for me to explain the cause of my delay. But when I entered

† B

the President's room, he, with great formality, rose from his chair; and Messrs. Wolcott and Pickering were also marked in their efforts to a like formality. I therefore resolved to wait for the unfolding of this mysterious appearance. Very few words passed between the President and myself; and those which fell from him, shewed plainly to me, that he wished to hurry to something else. Immediately afterwards, he put his hand into his pocket, and pulling out a large letter, said something of this nature: "Mr. Randolph! here is a letter, which I desire "you to read, and make such explanations, as you "choose." I took it, and found it to be a letter, written in French by Mr. Fauchet, on about fifteen pages of large paper. On reading the letter, I perceived, that two of the most material papers, which were called the dispatches No. 3 and 6, were not with it. I observed to the President, that I presumed the letter to be an intercepted one. He nodded his head. I then said, that at that time I could recollect very little, which would throw light on the affair; but I would go over the letter, and make such remarks as occurred to me. I did so; but being thus suddenly, and without any previous intimation, called upon before *a council*, which was minutely prepared at every point; not seeing two of the most essential references; and having but an imperfect idea of most of the circumstances alluded to, I could rely only on two principles, which were established in my mind; the first was, that according to my sincere belief, I never made an improper communication to Mr. Fauchet; the second was, that no money was ever received by me from him, nor any overture, made to him by me for that purpose. My observations therefore were but short. However, I had some recollection of Mr. Fauchet having told me of machinations against the French Republic, Governor Clinton and myself; and thinking it not improbable, that the overture, which was spoken of in No. 6, might be, in some manner, connected with that business, and might relate to the obtaining of intelligence, I mentioned my impression; observing at the same time, that I would throw my ideas on paper. The President desired Messrs. Wolcott and

Pickering to put questions to me. This was a style of proceeding, to which I would not have submitted, had it been pursued. But Mr. Pickering put no question; and Mr. Wolcott only asked an explanation of what I had said, as to Governor Clinton and myself. This I did not object to repeat, nearly as I had spoken it. Had I not been deprived of No. 6, the terms used in it, "*of fleeing from British persecution*," would probably have reminded me fully of the supposed machinations of Mr. Hammond and others. As it was, I mentioned the circumstance generally in the President's room, who remembered to have heard something of a meeting, held at New-York by Mr. Hammond and others during the last summer. While I was appealing to the President's memory for communications, which I had made to him on this subject; and after he had said, with some warmth, that he should not conceal any thing, which he recollect-  
ed, or words to that effect; he was called out to receive from Mr. Willing the copy of an address, which was to be presented to him the next day by the merchants. While he was out of the room, I asked, how the President came by Mr. Fauchet's letter. *Mr. Wolcott* said, "The President will, I presume, explain that to you." Upon the return of the President, he desired me to step into another room, while he should converse with Messrs. Wolcott and Pickering upon what I had said. I retired; and on revolving the subject, I came to this conclusion; that if the President had not been worked up to prejudge the case, he would not have acted in a manner, so precipitate in itself, and so injurious and humiliating to me: and that he would in the first instance, have interrogated me in private. After an absence of about three quarters of an hour, I returned into the President's room; when he told me that as I wished to put my remarks on paper, he desired that I would. I replied, that it should be done; but that I did not expect to remember much of the detail; for, in fact, I had then no distinct conception of what No. 3, and No. 6, might contain; except that it would seem from the inference in No. 10, as if I had encouraged the insurrection. The President then asked me, how soon I

could finish my remarks, I answered, as soon as possible. But I declared to him at the same instant, that I would not continue in the office one second after such treatment. I accordingly wrote to him the following letter.

*Philadelphia, Aug. 19, 1795.*

SIR,

IMMEDIATELY upon leaving your house this morning, I went to the office for the department of state, where I directed the room, in which I usually sat, to be locked up, and the key to remain with the messenger. My object in this was to let all the papers rest, as they stood.

Upon my return home, I reflected calmly and maturely upon the proceedings of this morning. Two facts immediately presented themselves; one of which was, that my usual hour of calling upon the President had not only been postponed for the opportunity of consulting *others* upon a letter of a foreign minister, highly interesting to my honour, before the smallest intimation to me; but they seemed also to be perfectly acquainted with its contents, and were requested to ask questions for their satisfaction: The other was, that I was desired to retire into another room, until you should converse with them, upon what I had said.

Your confidence in me, Sir, has been unlimited; and, I can truly affirm, unabused. My sensations then cannot be concealed, when I find that confidence so immediately withdrawn without a word or distant hint being previously dropped to me! This, Sir, as I mentioned in your room, is a situation in which I cannot hold my present office, and therefore I hereby resign it.

It will not, however, be concluded from hence, that I mean to relinquish the inquiry. No, Sir; far from it. I will also meet any inquiry, and to prepare for it, if I learn this morning, that there is a chance of overtaking Mr. Fauchet before he fails, I will go to him immediately.

I have to beg the favour of you to permit me to be furnished with a copy of the letter; and I will prepare an answer to it; which I perceive that I cannot do, as I wish, merely upon the few hasty memoranda which I took with my pencil.

I am satisfied, Sir, that you will acknowledge one piece of justice due on this occasion, which is, that until an inquiry can be made, the affair shall continue in secrecy under your injunction, after pledging myself for a more specific investigation of all these suggestions. For I here most solemnly deny, that any overture ever came from me, which was to produce money to me, or any others for me; and that in any manner, directly or indirectly, was a shilling ever received by me; nor was it ever contemplated by me, that one shilling should be applied by Mr. Fauchet to any purpose relative to the insurrection.

I presume, Sir, that the paper, No. 6, to which he refers, is not in your possession. Otherwise you would have shewn it to me. If I am mistaken, I cannot doubt, that you will suffer me to have a copy of it.

I shall pass my accounts at the Auditor's and Comptroller's office; and transmit to you a copy.

I have the honour to be,

Sir, with due respect,

Your most obedient servant,

EDM: RANDOLPH.

The President of the U. S.

*To the preceding letter I received this answer.*

To Edmund Randolph, Esq.

SIR,

YOUR resignation of the Office of State is received.

Candour induces me to give you, in a few words, the following narrative of facts.—The letter from Mr. Fauchet, with the contents of which you were made acquainted yesterday, was, as you supposed, an intercepted one.—It was sent by Lord Grenville to Mr. Hammond;—by him put into the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury;—by him shewn to the Secretary of War and the Attorney General;—and a translation thereof was made by the former, for me.—

At the time Mr. Hammond delivered the letter, he requested of Mr. Wolcott an attested copy, which was accordingly made by Mr. Thornton, his late secretary; and which is understood to remain at present with Mr. Bond.—Whether it is known to others, I am unable to decide.—

Whilst you are in pursuit of means to remove the strong suspicions arising from his letter, no disclosure of its contents will be made by me; and I will enjoin the same on the public officers who are acquainted with the purport of it; unless something shall appear to render an explanation necessary on the part of government;—of which I will be the judge.—

A copy of Mr. Fauchet's letter shall be sent to you.—No. 6, referred to therein I have never seen.—

G<sup>o</sup>. WASHINGTON.

Philadelphia, 20th Aug. 1795.

Having learnt, on the 20th of August, 1795, that the French frigate Medusa, which was to carry Mr. Fauchet to France, had not sailed ten days before; I left Philadelphia in the afternoon of the 21st for Newport in Rhode-Island. But being detained on the road by a disappointment in some necessary papers, and by other un-

avoidable causes, I did not arrive there until Monday, the 31st of August 1795, between the hours of eleven and twelve in the morning. I immediately proceeded to visit Mr. Fauchet; and told him, that his letter of the 10th of Brumaire (October 31st, 1794,) had been intercepted, and was in the hands of the President of the United States. After observing that he must recollect, how injuriously he had treated the government, others, and myself, in that letter, I informed him, that I had come for the purpose of demanding an explanation; but that I desired none, which was not consistent with truth and justice. I then mentioned the different points: and although in some particulars we did not remember alike; yet I required him to give me a certificate according to his memory. He appointed 8 o'clock in the next morning for the delivery of it to me; and understanding from him, that the Medusa could not sail, while the British ship of war, Africa, lay at the mouth of the harbour, I did not object to the time which he took. When I knocked at Mr. Fauchet's door at the last-mentioned hour, his servant informed me, that he was directed to tell me, that the promised certificate would not be ready until about 12 o'clock: I desired the servant to call Mr. Fauchet down stairs. When he came down, he said, that he was engaged in preparing the paper: that it could not be ready until 12 or 1 o'clock, and that as soon as it was ready, he would send or bring it to my lodgings. He also agreed upon my application, to answer any questions, which I should put to him; and it is known to a gentleman, whom I can name, that I had intended to put several questions to him, before Mr. Marchant, the judge of the District of Rhode-Island, and Mr. Malbone, a member of the House of Representatives, from whom I meant to ask the favour of attending to the business. While I was expecting to hear from Mr. Fauchet, it was said that the Medusa was weighing anchor. Astonished at this intelligence, I ran up to Mr. Fauchet's house; and found, that he had gone off. By the friendly assistance of Mr. Peck, the Marshal of the district, I dispatched the swiftest sailing boat in Newport in quest of the Medusa, with the following letter to Mr. Fauchet.

*Newport, Sept. 1, 1795.*

SIR,

I AM this moment informed, that the frigate has failed: and I have been to your house. They say that you are on board; and that you have left no paper for me, according to what you promised. My innocence of the insinuations, arising from your letter, you not only know, but have twice acknowledged to me. I send a boat therefore in a hurry to obtain the papers, which go to this point.

I am, Sir,

Your humble servant,

EDMUND RANDOLPH.

The boat having returned without overtaking the *Medusa*, Mr. Peck indorsed this certificate on the letter.

*September 1, 1795.*

MR. RANDOLPH, being greatly agitated at finding that Mr. Fauchet had gone off, requested me to employ a boat, at any expence, to go immediately in quest of the *Medusa*; in order to carry the within letter to Mr. Fauchet; I did in consequence employ the swiftest sailing vessel in the port, with instructions to pursue the frigate, as long as there was any chance of overtaking her. She went off several miles to sea, but could not overtake her.

WILLIAM PECK,

Marshal, Rhode-Island district.

Capt. Caleb Gardner, who acted as pilot to the *Medusa*, having returned to Newport, brought me from Mr. Fauchet a letter, of which the following is a translation.

*On board of the Medusa. 15 Fructidor, in the 3d year.*

*Joseph Fauchet to Mr. Randolph.*

SIR,

I have just transmitted to citizen Adet, the minister of the Republic in Philadelphia, the packet which I destined for you. He will send you a certified copy of my letter, with which, I hope, you will be satisfied.

Accept my esteem,

JOSEPH FAUCHET.

The painful embarrassment, which the sudden sailing of the Medusa had occasioned to me, induced me to request from Capt. Gardner a statement of the facts, relative thereto; and he gave me this certificate.

THIS is to certify that *Thursday* \* morning, September 1<sup>st</sup>, at 8 o'clock; the weather being very stormy, and a very large sea, the British ship Africa, was obliged to leave her station at the light-house, and go into the Naraganset bay: in consequence of which Captain Simeon, of the frigate Medusa, sent for the subscriber to embrace this opportunity to go to sea: at the same time sent for the ambassador, Mr. Fauchet, and all the passengers, at 9 o'clock. They could not get on board until 11 o'clock. From 9 o'clock until that time, the ship was short a peak; still detained for the passengers. In six minutes after they came on board we cut our cable and went to sea; leaving Mr. Provost on shore, one of the passengers. The weather was so foggy, that very often we could not see the land in beating the ship out of the harbour. Mr. Fauchet, all the time the subscriber was on board, which was until half past one o'clock, was in the cabin writing. The British ship Africa, came to sail two hours after the Medusa was at sea.

Newport, Sept. 2, 1795.

CALEB GARDNER.

N. B. The whole time I was on board the frigate, before her getting under sail, the captain discovered the greatest impatience. He repeatedly sent on shore to bring off Mr. Fauchet; expressed great concern, when my boat arrived without him; and when Mr. Fauchet did arrive at the frigate, treated him with great coolness and apparent indignation at his long delay.

CALEB GARDNER.

These and many other particulars, which manifest the distressing difficulties, into which I was thrown, can be proved by a respectable gentleman, now in Philadelphia. — Agreeably to the information of Mr. Fauchet, Mr. Adet sent me a copy of his certificate, the translations of which, and of the dispatches No. 3 and No. 6, which are referred to in the letter No. 10, and were also furnished by Mr. Adet, are as follow: —

\* Mr. Gardner has mislaid the day. It should be Tuesday.

## MR. FAUCET's CERTIFICATE.

MR. RANDOLPH requests me to examine a Dispatch No. 10, addressed to the Commissary of exterior relations; which has been transmitted to the President of the United States. I believe that I am bound to no explanations upon my communications to my government; when they are obtained by dark means of which I am ignorant; are commented upon without doubt, and mutilated according to the passions of those who use means so noble and generous. But I owe to Mr. Randolph full and intire justice. I will render it to him with pleasure. Every thing which could be interpreted to his disadvantage will not leave, I hope, after the explanation which I shall give, any doubt upon the mind even of those who have transmitted the letter to the President. The means which I shall employ will be very simple. This will be to cite the Dispatches to which I refer in my No. 10. Some preliminary reflections are necessary to explain them.

On my arrival on this continent the President gave me the most positive assurance, that he was the friend of the French cause. Mr. Randolph often repeated to me the same assurance. It was impossible for me not to give faith to it, (in spite of some public events relative to France which gave me some inquietude), especially when the Secretary of State constantly took pains to convince me of the sentiments of good-will of his government for my Republic. It was doubtless to confirm me in this opinion that he communicated to me, without authority, as I supposed, that part of Mr. Jay's instructions which forbade him to do any thing which should derogate from the engagements of the United States with France. My error, which was dear to me, was prolonged only by the continual efforts of Mr. Randolph to calm my fears both upon the treaty with England and upon the effect which it might produce on France. He was therefore far from confiding to me any act, any intention of government by virtue of any concert with me, or in consequence of any emolument received by him, or for the expectation or hope of any recompence promised, or with any other view than to maintain a good harmony between France and the United States. As to the communications which he has made to me at different times, they were only of opinions, the greater part, if not the whole of which, I have heard circulated as opinions. I also recollect that on one occasion, at least, which turned upon public measures, he observed to me, that he could not enter into details upon some of them, because by doing so he should violate the duties of his office. From whence I have concluded and believe that he never communicated to me what his duty would reprove. I will observe here, that none of his conversations with me concluded without his giving me the idea that the President was a man of integrity, and a sincere friend to France. This explains in part what I meant by the terms, "his precious confessions." I proceed to other details relative thereto. I could allude only to explanations on his part upon matters which had caused to me some inquietude: And I have never insinuated, nor could I insinuate in that

letter, that I suspected on his part even the most distant corruption. These explanations had equally for their object my different conversations upon Western affairs, as may be seen in the sequel of this declaration.

When I speak in this same paragraph in these words, "Besides, the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph alone cast upon all which happens a satisfactory light," I have still in view only the explanations of which I have spoken above; and I must confess that very often I have taken for confessions what he might have to communicate to me by virtue of a secret authority. And many things which in the first instant I had considered as confessions were the subject of public conversations. I will say more. I will say, that I have had more than suspicions that certain confidences which have been made to me, were only to found my private opinions, and the intentions of the French Republic; and I must appeal to the testimony of him, who this day claims mine. He must know if I ever endeavoured to meddle in the interior affairs of America, or even to influence, by any means whatsoever, the sentiments of men whose talents had called them to the head of affairs.

All that is read from these words, "I proceed then, &c." to these "The first was preparing, &c." is to be considered only as my own reflections arising from private information or from public reports, and not from any communications of Mr. Randolph.

I have spoken of a conversation which Citizen Le Blanc and myself had with Mr. Randolph, and which I had communicated in my No. 3. It is easy to see that I consider the conclusions which I draw from it, as pure and simple conjectures, as I express myself. This is an extract from that dispatch which I declare to be true. When I relate conversations of Mr. Randolph, I can easily suppose that as he spoke sometimes in English, most commonly in French, and I spoke always French, we might not have understood one another perfectly. And when I have not quoted Mr. Randolph expressly in the whole course of any observations, it is not under his authority that I speak.

As my dispatch, No. 3, treats of different subjects at the same time, I shall extract from it only what concerns him, with the help of my own memory and in consequence of his questions.

The conversation which I cite took place in April, 1794. We were speaking of some political divisions which manifested themselves in different parts of the United States, and of which the public papers gave sufficient proofs. He appeared to me to be deeply afflicted at the idea of a violent conflict between the parties. He hoped to prevent it by the influence which he hoped to acquire with the President, who he said generally consulted him, and to whom he told truths which probably others concealed from him. I had heard mentioned, and I frequently mentioned to him myself, the suspicions which were spread abroad, of the artifices of some influential men in the government, who were desirous of seeing the French cause ruined, and of uniting America more closely with Great Britain than with France. He replied to me upon this: The President is the mortal enemy of England, for the outrages which she heaps upon the United States, and the injustice and perfidy which she shews in her conduct towards them; and the declared friend of France. I can affirm it upon my honour. He may, like other men who do not mix generally with the world, be circumvented by stratagem, prepared

to surprise his judgment ; and without doubt if he suffers himself to be taken in by any manoeuvres, his popularity would be affected by it. He desires to give the Government stability ; others, under the pretext of giving energy to it, would surround the chief of the Executive with more power than the Constitution delegates to him. But in spite of all the efforts, and notwithstanding the cause of France and the true spirit of the American people are painted to him under false colours, he escapes at this moment from the snares which are laid for him, and nothing will be able to prevent him from conducting himself towards Great Britain with the firmness, which the repeated outrages of this power demand. This, Mr. Fauchet, is every thing, which I am at liberty to say to you. I will always treat with you with every frankness, which comports with my duty. As to myself, I would quit the post, which he has confided to me, if I could persuade myself, that he could accede to any act, which should affect the rights of the people. The bill, of which you speak, gives it is true to the Executive, some powers which if they should be abused, may wound liberty. I am sincerely affected by it. But I see with pleasure, that my reflections on the dreadful crisis, which would result from such an abuse, have produced a deep impression on the mind of the President, who is a man of honour. Let us unite, Mr. Fauchet, let us unite our efforts in drawing close the bonds of the two nations. The friends of liberty are for an intimate union with France. The partizans of slavery prefer an alliance with England.

I now come to the explanation of my dispatch, No. 6. A little time after my arrival in America, I had requested Mr. Randolph to recommend to me the most proper persons with whom he was acquainted in the different states, to be employed in the purchase of flour. This request naturally led him to believe that there were persons employed in it, as they really were. We had frequent conversations upon the insurrection, and in all of them he manifested an unequivocal indignation against the fomenters of it, and a deep affliction at the dangers of a civil war. I had learned, as my dispatch No. 10, shews, that the English were suspected of fomenting and supporting these manoeuvres. I communicated my suspicions to Mr. Randolph. I had already communicated to him a Congress, which at this time was holden at New-York. I had communicated to him fears, that this Congress would have for its object some manoeuvres against the Republic of France, and to render unpopular some virtuous men who were at the head of affairs ; to destroy the confidence which existed, on one hand, between General Clinton and his fellow-citizens, and on the other, that which united the President to Mr. Randolph. He said to me, that I ought to make efforts to obtain the proofs of this fact, and he added to me, that if I did so, the President would not hesitate to declare himself against all the manoeuvres which might be directed against the French republic. Things remained in this situation. About the month of July or August, in the last year, he came to see me at my country house. It was in the afternoon. He was to go that evening to Germantown. We had a private conversation of about twenty minutes. His countenance bespoke distress. He said to me, that he was afraid that a civil war would soon ravage America. I enquired of him what new information was procured. He said that he began to believe that in fact the English were really fomenting the in-

ferreption, and that he did not doubt, that Mr. Hammond and his Congress would push some measures with respect to the insurrection, with an intention of giving embarrassment to the United States. He demanded of me, if, as my Republic was itself interested in these manoeuvres, I could not by the means of some correspondents procure some information of what was passing. I answered him, that I believed I could. He replied upon this, that having formed many connections by the means of flour contracts, three or four persons among the different contractors might, by talents, energy, and some influence, procure the necessary information, and save America from a civil war, by proving that England interfered in the troubles of the West. I do not recollect, that he gave to me at that time any details upon the manner, in which this discovery would produce this last effect: But I perfectly recollect to have heard it said by some person or other, that the insurgents would be abandoned by the greatest number of those whom they believed to be on their side; and that the militia would march with cheerfulness, if it were proved, that the English were at the bottom of these manœuvres. I think therefore, that this was probably the manner, in which he conceived that things would be settled; and that he thought, that the insurrection would cease from the want of support. At the moment of his mounting his horse, he observed to me, that the men, whom I might be able to employ, might perhaps be debtors of English merchants; that in this case they might perhaps be exposed, on the slightest movement which they should make in this important affair, to see themselves harassed by process and even arrested by the pursuits of their creditors. He asked me if the payments of the sums which were due to them by virtue of the existing contracts, would not be sufficiently early to render these individuals independent of British persecution. I confess, that this proposition to obtain this intelligence surprised me. I was astonished that the government itself did not procure for itself information so precious. And I made the reflections, contained in my letter on this affair, because I believed, and do still believe, that all the citizens in the United States, ought to endeavour to furnish intelligence so important, without being stopped by the fear of English persecution; and because I moreover thought, when I committed my reflections to paper, that it was proposed to obtain the foregoing intelligence by assisting with loans those who had contracted with me. But now calling to mind all the circumstances, to which the questions of Mr. Randolph call my attention, I have an intimate conviction that I was mistaken in the propositions, which I supposed to have been made to me.

I declare moreover, that no name or sum was mentioned to me: that Mr. Randolph never received, either directly or indirectly, by himself or by another for his use, one shilling from myself, by my order, or according to my knowledge, heresay or belief, from any other public officer of France. I declare that he never made to me in this respect a single overture; and that no part of the above circumstance has the least relation to him personally. Farther I solemnly declare, that from the time of my arrival I have repeated, when an opportunity has presented itself, and without doubt often in the presence of Mr. Randolph, that the morals of my

nation and the candour of my government severely forbid the use of money in any circumstances, which could not be publicly avowed.

Signed

JOSEPH FAUCHET.

I the undersigned Peter Augustus Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, certify, that the foregoing Copy is absolutely conformable to the Declaration which Citizen Fauchet, my predecessor, has written and signed with his own hand, and which he has sent me to be lodged in the Archives of the French Legation, and in order that a copy conformable thereto may be delivered to Mr. Randolph.

In testimony of which I have signed these presents at Philadelphia, on the 5th supplementary day, in the 3d Year of the French Republic, one and indivisible. September 27, 1795, (Old Style).

P. A. ADET.

*Extract from the Political Dispatch, No. 3, of Joseph Fauchet, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

" THEN the Secretary of State appeared to open himself without reserve: He imparted to me the intestine divisions, which were rumbling in the United States. The idea of an approaching commotion affected him deeply. He hoped to prevent it, by the ascendancy which he daily acquired over the mind of the President, who consulted him in all affairs, and to whom he told the truth, which his colleagues disguised from him.

" The President of the United States, says he, is the mortal enemy of England; and the friend of France, I can affirm it upon my honour. But not mixing with the world, he may be circumvented by the dark manœuvres of some men, who wind themselves in an hundred ways, to draw him into measures, which will cause him to lose all his popularity. Under the pretext of giving energy to the government, they would absolutely make a monarch of him. They deceive him, as to the true spirit of the people; as well as upon the affairs of France. I am sure, that at this moment, he escapes from them, and that in all these perfidious manœuvres they have not been able to dissuade him from pronouncing with vigor against the ministry of England. He has—— but it is im-

possible for me in conscience to make you this confession. I should betray the duties of my office. Every thing, which I can say to you, is, that it is important for our two nations, that you continue to visit him frequently. He will be touched with the proofs of friendship, which you shall testify to him; and I am sure, that this will be an infallible means of causing them to be valued. I would quit the post, which he has confided to me, if he could be brought to make any attempt upon the rights of the people. A bill has passed the house of representatives, which wounds liberty. They have at least taken away the article which prevents the sale of the French prizes in our ports. My heart is troubled by it. But I have seen with pleasure, that my reflections on this subject, upon the dreadful crisis, which would result from an abuse of it, have made a deep impression upon the mind, I will even say, upon the heart of the President, who is an honourable man. Let us unite, Mr. Fauchet, to draw our two nations closer together. Those who love liberty, are for fraternizing with the French Republic, the partizans of slavery prefer an alliance with England.

" I, he said to me, (in speaking of the treaty of Jay\*), that there is no question in his mission, but to demand a solemn reparation for the spoliations which our commerce has experienced on the part of England; and to give you a proof, that Mr. Jay cannot enter into a negociation contrary to what we owe to France, I will give you the part of the instructions which concern it.

" Although the following note, which I have, written in his own hand, with a promise to burn it, be little important, I annex it hereto.

" If the English ministry shall insinuate, that the whole or any part of these instructions should appear to be influenced by a supposed predilection in favour of France, you will arrest the subject as being foreign to the present question. It is what the English nation has no right to object to; because we are free in our sentiments and independent in our government."

" The following case is to be unchangeable. As there is no doubt, that the English ministry will endeavour to detach us from France, you will inform them of the firm determination of the government of the United States, not to deviate from our treaties, or our engagements with France."

\* The word affirin, appears to have been omitted in the certified copy.

*Extract from the Political Dispatch, No. 6, of Citizen Fauchet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to the United States.*

" SCARCE was the commotion known, when the Secretary of State came to my house. All his countenance was grief. He requested of me a private conversation. It is all over, he said to me. A civil war is about to ravage our unhappy country. Four men by their talents, their influence, and their energy may save it. But debtors of English merchants, they will be deprived of their liberty, if they take the smallest step. Could you lend them instantaneously funds, sufficient to

shelter them from English persecution. This inquiry astonished me much. It was impossible for me to make a satisfactory answer. You know my want of power, and my defect of pecuniary means. I shall draw myself from the affair by some common place remarks, and by throwing myself on the pure and unalterable principles of the republic.

“ I have never since heard of propositions of this nature.”

I the undersigned Peter Augustus Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, near the United States of America, certify those to whom it belongs, that the dispatches, No. 3 and 6, mentioned in the dispatch No. 10, of the 10th of Brumaire, in the 3d year, addressed by Citizen Fauchet, my predecessor, to the commissary of exterior relations, are relative to a number of objects entirely foreign to Mr. Randolph, and that the extracts which I have delivered to him agreeably to his request, contain both the conversation and the overtures, of which Citizen Fauchet speaks in his dispatch.

I certify moreover, that at the request of Mr. Randolph I have examined the dispatches of Citizen Fauchet to the French government; and that whenever Citizen Fauchet has had occasion to speak of Mr. Randolph, in respect to his morality, he always describes him as an honest and upright man.

Given at Philadelphia, under my hand and seal of the French legation, the 4th of Vendemaire, in the 3d year of the Republic, one and indissoluble.

P. A. ADET.

*To the President of the United States, Mount Vernon.*

*Philadelphia, Sept. 21, 1795.*

SIR,

I RETURNED yesterday from Germantown; and this morning I shall proceed to the examination of the necessary papers. Finding it important to one branch of the subject, that I should ask a small addition to the narrative in your letter of the 20th ultimo, I have to request, that I may be informed, as far as may be in your power, when Mr. Hammond put Mr. Fauchet's letter into the hands of Mr. Wolcott, and when an intimation was given, Sir, of that letter to you. I wish to ascertain, without the necessity of resorting to circumstances, the earliest notice, which you received of the existence of such a letter. If you could add the probable time, when the British secretary of state, Lord Grenville, obtained the letter, and when the British minister here procured it, I should be enabled to be more particular in my vindication.

You inform me in your letter of the 20th ultimo, that you had never seen Mr. Fauchet's dispatch, No. 6, which is referred to in his letter; and as you did not shew or send to me, with the other papers, the dispatch

No. 3, I shall continue to presume, that you have as yet not seen them. If you have, it will certainly be conceived proper, that I should be furnished with copies of them, in order that I may know whether the papers in your hands, under the name of the dispatches No. 3 and 6, agree with what has been stated to me as their contents; and that if there be a difference, I may take the best measures for establishing which is true.

As nothing detains me in Philadelphia, but the completion of this business, which requires an extensive detail, and large transcription of papers, I must hope that if there be any other document, which bears the least affinity to the main subject, I may have an opportunity through your intervention of meeting it before I take my departure to Virginia.

*To Edmund Randolph, Esquire.*

SIR,

I HAVE lately received three letters from you:—two bearing date the 15th instant;—the other the 21st.—One of the former came to hand the 19th—the other the 21st—and the latter yesterday.

Your signature as Secretary of State to the ratification of the treaty having been given on the 14th of August—and your resignation not taking place until the 19th, it became necessary, in order to be consistent, (the original being dispatched) that the same countersign should appear to the copies;—otherwise this act would not have been required of you.

It is not in my power to inform you at what time Mr. Hammond put the intercepted letter of Mr. Fauchet into the hands of Mr. Wolcott.—I had no intimation of the existence of such a letter until after my arrival in Philadelphia, the 11th of August. When Lord Grenville first obtained that letter, and when the British minister here received it from him, are facts with which I am entirely unacquainted.

I have never seen in whole or in part, Mr. Fauchet's dispatches numbered three and six;—nor do I possess any documents, or knowledge of papers which have affinity to the subject in question.

No man would rejoice more than I should, to find that the suspicions which have resulted from the intercepted letter, were unequivocally and honourably removed.

G<sup>o</sup>. WASHINGTON,

*Mount Vernon, 27th of Sept. 1795.*

*Philadelphia, October 2, 1795:*

SIR,

I YESTERDAY received from the President a letter dated on the 27th of September 1795; containing, in answer to mine of the 21st, the following clauses. "It is not in my power to inform you, at what time Mr. Hammond put the intercepted letter of Mr. Fauchet into the hands of Mr. Wolcott. I had no intimation of the existence of such a letter until after my arrival in Philadelphia, the 11th of August. When Lord Grenville first obtained that letter, and when the British minister here received it from him, are facts with which I am entirely unacquainted."

"I have never seen in whole or in part Mr. Fauchet's dispatches, numbered three and six; nor do I possess any document or knowledge of papers, which have affinity to the subject in question."

As the British minister conveyed through your hands this business to the President, I hold myself authorised to inquire from you into some material facts, as they probably rest in your knowledge. These are, as to the time when Mr. Hammond put the letter into your hands; as to Lord Grenville, Mr. Hammond, or yourself, having seen or been possessed of No. 3 and 6, or either of them; as to there being any other paper in or out of cypher, connected with this affair, which may be brought up in my absence. If you have heard the time, about which Lord Grenville first obtained the letter, and when the British minister here received it from him, information of it will tend to elucidate some other points.

I am, Sir,  
Your humble servant,  
EDMUND RANDOLPH.

O. Wolcott, Esq.

*Philadelphia, October 2d, 1795.*

SIR,

I HAVE received your letter of this date, and I readily reply to your enquiries.

Mr. Fauchet's letter to which you allude was delivered to me by Mr. Hammond on the 28th of July; and on the evening of the 11th of August, I presented it to the President.

I have never seen or been possessed of Mr. Fauchet's letters, numbered 3 or 6, or either of them, in or out of cypher, and I have no knowledge whether they or either of them, have been seen by Lord Grenville or Mr. Hammond.

† D

It is impossible for me to say whether any other document may be hereafter brought into view, as connected with the subject in question. Perhaps something will depend upon the manner in which the discussion of this affair may be managed on your part,—as this may render an enquiry after other papers necessary. You may be assured, however, that nothing has been at any time concealed by me, to your prejudice.

The letter which I received from Mr. Hammon, was, as I have been informed, taken from the Jean Bart, a French vessel.—I do not know the time, when it was received by Lord Grenville or by Mr. Hammond. It rests in my memory, however, that Mr. Hammond informed me, that the letter had been received by him, but a short time before it was presented to me, but of this fact I am not certain.

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

OLIV. WOLCOTT.

Edmund Randolph, Esq.

Philadelphia, October 8, 1795.

SIR,

YOU mistook me, if you supposed, that I meant to propound to you any question, the answer to which should prevent the appearance of any paper whatsoever. I knew that this must depend upon the head of the executive; and I put at defiance all papers, which now are, or hereafter may be seen. I only wished to learn, before my departure for Virginia, whether any thing more than the letter, No. 10, had been used in Mr. Hammond's machinations; so as to be able to prepare now to repel it.

It is material, however, to understand what observations, or message, from Mr. Hammond or his government, accompanied the communication of the letter to you; in order that they might be transmitted to the President. For if I am to judge from some hints, which have been given in the public prints, and from other data, I have reason to conclude, that Mr. Hammond was *particularly instructed* upon the occasion. In short, candor entitles me to expect, that you will not hesitate to give me this information.

I am, Sir,

Your humble servant,

EDMUND RANDOLPH.

•. Wolcott, Esq.

Philadelphia, October 8, 1795.

S I R,

NOTWITHSTANDING I am convinced, that a knowledge of the minute circumstances mentioned in your letter of this date, cannot be material to your defence, and though you have already been particularly informed of the manner in which Mr. Fauchet's letter was conveyed to the President; yet I mean not to incur the imputation of wanting candour, by forbearing a reply to your inquiry.

When the existence of the intercepted letter was first mentioned to me by Mr. Hammond, he did not intimate, or request, that its contents might be communicated to the President:—it was my own suggestion, that the letter ought to be delivered to me for that purpose:—to this Mr. Hammond finally assented, upon the condition that a copy, certified by me, should remain in his hands.

My motive for wishing to obtain the original letter will readily be discerned:—without possessing it, I could not safely venture to make any representation of its contents, and I felt no disposition to be the secret depository of facts affecting not only your character, but also the public interests.

The nature of your inquiries on this subject leads me to assure you, that I am not conversant in the secrets of foreign ministers, and that I cannot say whether Mr. Hammond was, or was not, *particularly instructed* to communicate Mr. Fauchet's letter to the President;—no such instruction was mentioned to me.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

OLIV. WOLCOTT.

Edmund Randolph, Esq.

Philadelphia, October 8, 1795.

S I R,

UNTIL Monday last I did not obtain from the office those of my own letters, which I deem proper to be introduced into my vindication. But I still want the inspection of a letter from you, dated July 22, 1795, and received by me. I applied personally at the office on Saturday last for the sight of your letters to me. The chief clerk went into the room, in which Mr. Pickering sits, to consult him, at my desire, upon my application. He afterwards carried to Mr. Pickering a brown paper; and on his return placed it before me. It contained *many* of your letters, and was indorsed to this purport, “*The President's Letters.*” I presumed, that they were *all* there; as no mention was made to me of any, that were

missing. But not finding that of July 22, 1795, I asked for it; and the chief clerk replied, that Mr. Pickering had just taken it out; and that upon his saying, that I might probably wish to see it, Mr. Pickering had observed, that, if I did, I would ask for it. I accordingly asked for it again; but was answered, that it was necessary to consult Mr. Wolcott. Not hearing any thing late on Monday from the chief clerk, I reminded him by a note, and on Tuesday received thro' him the rancorous and insolent answer of Mr. Pickering, which amounts to a positive refusal, and of which due notice will hereafter be taken. I affirm to you, that I hold that letter to be important to one of the views, which the question will bear. As I aim at accuracy in my statements, I am anxious to prevent a mistake in my recollection of that letter, and therefore request the inspection of it.

Mr. Fauchet's letter and the circumstances which preceded and attended the delivery of it to me, embrace a variety of political matter, connected with many documents. The papers and reasonings in my general letter will comprehend among others the following: my letter to the governor of Vermont, on the 28th of July, 1794; Mr. Bradford's letter from Fort Pitt, on the 17th of August 1794; mine to the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 28th of August 1794: a letter, which in the latter end of July, 1794, you directed me to write to a certain person; two late letters to Col. Monroe; my letter to Mr. Jay on the 18th August, 1794; my last circular letter to our ministers; your letters to me on the 22d and 31st July, 1795, with the memorial therein referred to; my letter to you on the 12th of July, 1795; the affidavit, which was laid before you of the British being supposed to be concerned in the insurrection; the advice of another gentleman and myself to you, on the 25th of August 1794; extracts from Mr. Jay's and Mr. Monroe's instructions; and my letter to you on the 15th August 1794.

You must be sensible, Sir, that I am inevitably driven into the discussion of many confidential and delicate points. I could with safety immediately appeal to the people of the United States, who can be of no party. But I shall wait for your answer to this letter, so far as it respects the paper desired, before I forward to you my general letter, which is delayed for no other cause. I shall also rely, that any supposed error in the general letter, in regard to facts, will be made known to me, and that you will consent to the whole of this affair, howsoever confidential and delicate, being exhibited to the world.

At the same time, I prescribe to myself this condition, not to mingle any thing which I do not sincerely conceive to belong to the subject.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

With due respect,

Your most obedient servant,

EDM: RANDOLPH.

The President of the United States, Mount Vernon.

SIR,

AGREEABLY to the suggestion in your note to me, received yesterday, I laid the same before Colonel Pickering, whose answer I am authorized to send you, in the following words, viz.

" The letter from the President, dated the 22d of July, 1795, of which Mr. Randolph has requested the inspection, does not appear to have any connection with the intercepted letter of Mr. Fauchet; and, cannot possibly have referred to it; because the President was at that time ignorant even of its existence: and Mr. Randolph perfectly well knows that his resignation was occasioned solely by the evidence of his criminal conduct exhibited in Mr. Fauchet's letter. The inspection of the President's letter then cannot be necessary for Mr. Randolph's exculpation."

*Department of State, October 6, 1795.*

GEO: TAYLOR, jun. Chief Clerk.

Edmund Randolph, Esquire.

*To Edmund Randolph, Esquire.*

SIR,

IN several of the public gazettes I have read your note to the Editor of the Philadelphia Gazette, with an extract of a letter addressed to me of the 8th instant; but it was not until yesterday, that the letter itself was received.

It is not difficult, from the tenor of that letter, to perceive what your objects are; but that you may have no cause to complain of the withholding any paper (however private and confidential) which you shall think necessary in a case of so serious a nature, I have directed that you should have the inspection of my letter of the 22d of July, agreeably to your request:—and you are at full liberty to publish, without reserve, *any* and *every* private and confidential letter I ever wrote you;—nay more—every word I ever uttered to, or in your presence, from whence you can derive any advantage in your vindication.

I grant this permission, inasmuch as the extract alluded to, manifestly tends to impress on the public mind an opinion, that something has passed between us which you should disclose with reluctance, from motives of delicacy which respect me.

You know, Sir, even before the treaty was laid before the Senate, that I had difficulties with respect to the commercial part of it; with which I professed to be the least acquainted; and that I had no means of acquiring information thereon without disclosing its contents:—not to do which until it was submitted to the Senate, had been resolved on.—You know

too, that it was by determination previous to this submission, to ratify the treaty if it should be so advised and consented to by that body;—and that the doubts which afterwards arose, and were communicated to Mr. Hammond, proceeded from more authentic information of the existence of what is commonly called the Provision order of the British government.—And finally, you know the grounds on which my ultimate decision was taken; as the same were expressed to you, the other secretaries of departments, and the late attorney general, after a thorough investigation and consideration of the subject, in all the aspects in which it could be placed.

As you are no longer an officer of the government, and propose to submit your vindication to the public, it is not my desire, nor is it my intention to receive it otherwise than through the medium of the press.—Facts you cannot mistake—and if they are fairly and candidly stated, they will invite no comments.

The extract of your letter to me, dated the 8th instant, being published in all the gazettes, I request that this letter may be inserted in the compilation you are now making;—as well to shew my disposition to furnish you with every means I possest towards your vindication, as that I have no wish to conceal any part of my conduct from the public.—That public will judge, when it comes to see your vindication, how far, and how proper it has been for you, to publish private and confidential communications—which, oftentimes have been written in a hurry, and sometimes without even copies being taken.—And it will, I hope, appreciate my motives, even if it should condemn my prudence, in allowing you the unlimitted license herein contained.

*Philadelphia 21st of October, 1795.*

G<sup>o</sup>: WASHINGTON.

*Philadelphia, October 24, 1795.*

SIR,

I AFFIRM to you, that the delay which has occured in the arrival of my letter of the 8th instant to your hands, is not to be ascribed to me. It was sent to the post-office on Friday the 9th, but too late I believe for the mail of that day. If I am not misinformed, it reached Alexandria on Wednesday the 14th; from whence it was brought back on Saturday the 17th; you having passed through that town on your return. You came hither on Tuesday, the 20th, in the afternoon.

Whatsoever my objects may be supposed to be, I have but one; which is, *to defend myself*. Your unlimited permission of publication is therefore, as you must be well persuaded, given without hazard. For you never could believe, that I intended to exhibit to public view *all* and *every* thing which was known to me. I have indeed the sensibility of an injured man; but I shall disclose even what I am compelled to disclose, under

the operation of the necessity which you yourself have created. I have been the meditated victim of party spirit.

From the tenor of your letter of the 21st instant, I perceive that you have controled the opinions of Mr. Pickering and Mr. Wolcott, by virtually admitting your proceedings on the treaty with Great Britain to be material in the case to be laid before our country. I must however contend, from a variety of written and other proofs in my possession, that what you in that letter denominate "*doubts communicated to Mr. Hammond*," will be found to have been considered by you from the 13th of July to the 11th August, as "*your determination*;" and that "*the grounds on which your ultimate decision was professed to be taken*" were little if at all different from those which had been often examined by you before my interview with Mr. Hammond.

My intention in troubling you with my letter of detail was merely to prevent a controversy about facts. But since you rest them upon my statement. I pledge myself to aim at accuracy. If I do not succeed, it will not be my fault that an error shall have crept into my narrative. But I shall be ready to correct it, and to renounce any inference which I may have deduced from it.

Your letter, Sir, of yesterday, shall be published as you request. To the people I always meant to appeal. It will be in the form of a letter addressed to you, as many of the facts are best known to you; but I shall disclaim, as I have always disclaimed, an appeal to an inferior authority. The people will see, that I have not imitated some others, in treasuring up your letters or observations, from any expectation of producing them at a future day; that I have never betrayed your confidence; and that even were "*your prudence may be condemned*," your "*unlimited licence*," is no more, than a qualified effort to do justice. It would have been less equivocal, if it had not been accompanied with a kind of threat; and the candour, which the letter seems to wear, would have been more seasonable, had it commenced with this injurious business. You hold, Sir, a number of my private letters, of which I kept no copy, and which I should be glad to inspect. But notwithstanding they would add weight to the proofs, which I might produce, of all my opinions to you being founded on a regard to the rights of the people, and a love of order, I shall leave them with yourself as evidences of my fidelity.

I have the honour to be Sir,

With due respect,

You most obedient servant,

EDM: RANDOLPH.

The President of the United States.

FINDING from the foregoing letter of the President, and other sources of information, that we are likely to differ *in degree* upon his proceedings in regard to the treaty; I should have apprized him beforehand of the manner in which I have always understood them. But being led by one of the expressions in that letter, to suppose, that he is not desirous of entering into a *previous* discussion of facts; I shall endeavour explicitly to represent the intire truth; after repeating, that it shall not be my fault, if it be not displayed.

The treaty arrived on the evening of the 7th day of March, 1795; and was by the President's order rigidly concealed by me from every person upon earth, without a single exception, until I was permitted to divulge it. I challenge the whole world to prove the contrary. Scarcely a day passed, on which he saw me, that he did not enumerate many objections to it;—objections, going not only to the commercial part, but also to the Canada article, which though seemingly reciprocal in words, would, as he thought, want reciprocity in practice; to the omission of compensation for the negroes and property plundered; and to some other parts of less consequence. When the message which was to accompany the treaty to the Senate, was about to be prepared, at the latter end of May, 1795, I observed to him, that it was necessary for him to make up his mind to ratify or not; and he answered, that although the treaty was so exceptionable to him, yet he would not separate from the Senate. At this time the order of the British king for seizing our provision-vessels, bound to France had never been heard of by the President; and even then he considered himself as at perfect liberty, to ratify or not. On the 24th of June 1795, the Senate advised the conditional ratification. He then expressed a wish, that the public opinion could be heard upon the subject; and notwithstanding the vote of the Senate as to secrecy, he authorized me on the 29th to promise to Mr. Brown the printer a copy of the treaty for publication, with a view to draw forth the sentiments of the people. I accordingly gave him a paragraph for insertion on Monday the 29th, assuring the public, that the

treaty would appear on the Wednesday following. Mr. Brown would have received the copy of the treaty immediately, if I had not delivered the only one, which I had, to Mr. Adet the French minister by the President's direction. But before Wednesday arrived, it came forth from another pres.

During the sitting of the Senate, a paragraph appeared in an English paper, mentioning the foregoing provision-order, as it is called. But there was nothing satisfactory concerning its existence or particulars. When they rose, the President was so far convinced, though not officially, of its existence, that he admitted it, as a fact, upon which to reason in respect to the treaty. Then it was, that is, soon after the Senate rose, that he began to balance, whether to ratify or not. He acknowledges that he doubted; and I am ready to own that shortly after the rising of the Senate, until the 13th of July 1795, he doubted only; though with great strength. This it was, which induced me to hold with Mr. Hammond, the conversation of the 29th of June 1795 \*, which is recorded in the department

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\* *Substance of a Conversation with Mr. Hammond, June 29, 1795,  
11 o'Clock, A. M.*

I called upon him, and told him, that as he wished formerly a sight of the treaty when I could not shew it to him, I would now very willingly impart it, if he wished to see it. He said, that he supposed the essence of it was in Bache's paper of this morning. I replied, that the detail would give the subject more completely. He then said, that frankly speaking he had seen a copy, which\* *a member of the Senate had brought to him*: that he was much pleased with the treaty himself. This last expression was put into two or three different shapes, to draw something from me. I observed only, that by the constitution it now rested with the President, and that he had entered into the consideration of the subject. He then read a letter from Lord Grenville to him, on the 18th of April 1795, expressing great solicitude at not having heard of the arrival of the treaty at Philadelphia; and urging Mr. Hammond to give the earliest notice of its arrival, and of the steps taken. Our conversation closed with his saying, that if he wished to consult the treaty further, he would call upon me for a further inspection of it.

EDM: RANDOLPH.

\* Mr. King.

† E

of state, and was approved by the President. This it was, which induced me to write to Mr. Monroe on the 2d of July, 1795, under the President's eye and special correction, that "the President has not yet decided upon the final measure to be adopted by himself." This it was, which induced him to consult all the officers of government upon some collateral points. This it was, which induced him to consult a certain individual upon the treaty at large; and to require me to give an opinion, which I delivered to him on the 12th of July 1795, in the evening.

That opinion will be particularly stated in my general letter. But it is necessary to quote the following concluding passages:

"I take the liberty then of suggesting, that a personal interview be immediately had between the secretary of state and Mr. Hammond, and that the substance of the address to him be this.—

"I know, Sir, that you are acquainted with the late treaty between the United States and his Britannic Majesty; and presume, that you have seen the vote of the Senate, advising a ratification of it upon condition. That treaty being still subject to the negative of the President is now before him, undetermined as to its fate. The candour, which has reigned throughout our proceedings, induces me, with the permission of the President, to explain to you, as the minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty near the United States, what is the course of his reflection upon this momentous transaction. If his Majesty could doubt the sincerity of the President's professions to maintain full harmony with the British nation, his doubt would vanish, when he is told, Sir, as I now tell you, that, notwithstanding after the most mature consideration of the treaty, there are several parts by no means coincident with his wishes and expectations; yet he had determined to ratify it, in the manner advised by the Senate.—He had determined to put his hand to it without again submitting it, even after the insertion of the new article, to the Senate.

"But we are informed by the public gazettes, and by letters tolerably authentic, that vessels, even American vessels, laden with provisions for France, may be captured and dealt with, as carrying a kind of qualified contraband. If this be not true, you can correct me.

"Upon the supposition of its truth, the President cannot persuade himself, that he ought to ratify, during the existence of the order. His reasons will be detailed in a proper representation through you (Mr. Hammond) to his Britannic Majesty. At the same time, that order being removed, he will ratify without delay, or farther scruple. Of this also his Britannic Majesty will be informed in the most explicit and unequivocal terms.

"Now, Sir, the object of my interview with you arises from my recollection of your having expressed to me a wish, that the ratifications should

be exchanged here; in order that you might have some agency in closing the treaty. I am thus led to believe, that it may not be disagreeable to you, to undertake what I shall now have the honour of proposing to you.

“ Supposing that Mr. Jay’s negotiation would absorb every controversy: that nothing would be left to be done for some time in the ordinary course of residence: and that Mr. Pinckney would have returned to London before he was wanted there, he was dispatched, as our envoy, to Madrid. He did not commence his journey until the 11th of May last. The secretary of the legation, Mr. Deas, is the only person remaining in London, as the political agent of the United States. Being desirous of communicating every thing here, as far as we can, it has occurred to me to state in a memorial to you the situation of the business, and the foregoing declaration of the President’s purpose to ratify. This, we presume, will be immediately transmitted through you to the British ministry. The reply may be handed to Mr. Deas. You will also be furnished with a copy of the form in which the President means to ratify, when the order is rescinded.

“ The President had indeed once thought to order one of our European ministers on to London to supply for this purpose the place of Mr. Pinckney. But the most weighty objections render this impracticable; and it may be also conceived that to send over a fresh diplomatic character at this stage of the business, would neither be very easy, nor very expeditious.

“ It is also contemplated by the President to propose that for the purpose of saving delay, the ratifications may be exchanged here. For although he does not doubt the constitutionality of the Senate’s act, and is advised too, that the proposed article, if agreed to by his Britannic Majesty, need not be submitted to them before ratification, yet he entertains serious doubts whether he can himself ratify, without having the very article under his eye, after it shall have been assented to by his Britannic Majesty. The difference of time in the one form or the other will consist only in a voyage from London to Philadelphia. Provision will be made for the subscription in London of any papers, which form may require.

“ You will oblige me, Sir, by giving me your sentiments on this statement.”

In the morning of the 13th of July 1795, the President instructed me in his room, to have the proposed interview with Mr. Hammond immediately, and to address him as I had suggested. I instantly returned to the office, and sent a note, requesting him to come thither. He came in half an hour; and I executed the President’s instructions. Mr. Hammond asked me, if it would not be sufficient to remove the order out of the way; and after the ratification to renew it? I replied, perhaps with some warmth, that this would be a mere shift, as the principle was the important thing. He then asked me, if

the President was irrevocably determined not to ratify; if the provision-order was not removed? I answered, that I was not instructed upon that point. He said, that he would convey my observations to Lord Grenville by a vessel which was to sail the next day; and then left me.

I immediately returned to the President's room, and acquainted him with the foregoing circumstances. He said, that I might have informed Mr. Hammond, that he never would ratify, if the provision-order was not removed out of the way.—He then directed me to prepare the memorial of which I had spoken to Mr. Hammond, the form of ratification, and instructions for the person, who was to manage the business in London.

The next day, being Tuesday the 14th of July 1795, I met with Mr. Hammond at the President's public room; when he took me on one side, and again enquired of me, if he was irrevocably determined not to ratify the treaty during the existence of the provision-order? added, that he had written to Lord Grenville what I had communicated to him the day before; and asked me, when he might expect the memorial, which my communication promised to him. It is true, that with respect to the provision-order I might have told him, what the President had declared the day before. But as my conversation was designed only to shew, that the President had not let the subject sleep, and that he had taken his decision; and as the promised memorial would so soon repeat the same ideas, I saw no necessity for changing for the present the ground, upon which it had been placed by me. As to the memorial, I engaged, that he should have it before he sailed; which was sufficiently early for every purpose; since it was proposed by me in my letter abovementioned, on the 12th of July 1795, and approved by the President on the next day, not to send over a new minister;—but to use Mr. Hammond's agency.—I do not assert that I related to the President this last conversation with Mr. Hammond; but I believe I did.

The President left this city for Mount Vernon on Wednesday the 15th of July 1795. As soon afterwards as an indisposition, and the nature of the subject, would permit, I

prepared, as will be immediately stated, the memorial; and at different times seeing Mr. Hammond, and learning from him, when he expected to go, I constantly assured him, that it should be ready for him. Not having by me copies of all the private letters, which I wrote to the President, while he was in Virginia, I may not perhaps observe the due order in mentioning the papers; but for the facts in other respects I vouch.

The President wrote to me from Baltimore on the 18th of July 1795, desiring, that the address of the people of Boston should be taken into consideration by the secretaries and attorney-general. They were collected immediately upon the receipt of the letter; and did not at once agree, whether an answer should or should not be returned. But it was mentioned then by me, as I had mentioned to one or two at least of them before, and as I mentioned again the next day, that the President had taken a determination pursuant to the abovementioned communication to Mr. Hammond. It was on this fact, that the answer to that address contained the following passage:—"Under this persuasion I have resolved on the manner of executing the duty before me." There was at this time no other "*resolution*" of the President, to which the answer could refer; and I never could have assented to that phrase, but from my knowledge, that the President had *resolved*, (though the final formal act was yet incomplete) not to ratify the treaty, until the provision-order was arranged to his satisfaction.

Next in date is the memorial, the rough draught of which was sent to the President, containing the following passages:

"BUT neither his Britannic Majesty nor the world will be surprised, when they shall be informed, that the disposition to ratify has been *suspended* at least by a recent order, issued under the royal authority. Its genuineness, though not ascertained by official documents, is scarcely any where doubted. It is understood to import, that all ships, of whatever nation, laden with corn or other provisions for French ports, may be seized, and from this description not even neutral vessels are excepted. Against this doctrine the United States have often protested; and more particularly in the memorial of their minister plenipotentiary in London to the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, and in a letter from

the department of state to the minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty in Philadelphia, on the \*——— It was not without regret, that the efforts were unsuccessful in conforming to the current of modern treaties the definition of contraband. But that the order of the 8th of June 1793 was thus repeated upon the United States by the proposed treaty, was as abhorrent from the rules of construction, as an acquiescence in that construction was remote from every opinion hitherto formed. It was believed, and is still believed, that the treaty justifies no such interpretation. The considerations, which indispose the United States to yield to it, are too obvious to require an enumeration; *and gain, instead of losing force, every day.* To ratify then, in the face of this comment, would stamp upon \*——— article a meaning which the United States disavow; and contribute to the establishment of a principle, against which they revolt. Hence objections, which might have been overbalanced by the hope of burying past differences, and of raising a barrier against fresh injuries array themselves again in view; when the abandonment of them, notwithstanding, leaves behind this burthen upon American agriculture and commerce.”——

\* \* \* \* \*

“ But as in the language of the constitution of the United States, the President is to *make* the treaty, no method is satisfactory to him, by which he can or ought to delegate to a subordinate agent the determination when the proposed treaty shall become the supreme law of the land. With this impression, he cannot *now* adopt any style of ratification which shall preclude him from being personally satisfied, that the advice and consent of the Senate, which are the ground-work of his action on treaties, have been truly pursued. To demonstrate, however, that candour alone prevails throughout this transaction, there is annexed to this memorial the draught of a ratification which the President *contemplates to use*, whenever the occasion shall require; that is, *when he shall be satisfied as to the order for seizing provisions, and constitutional forms, present no objection.*

“ The chief obstacle, which is dependent for its removal on his Britannic Majesty, is the order above stated. The President is too much deprived of its particulars, to declare, what shall be his irrevocable determination; but the sensibility, which it has excited in his mind, cannot be allayed *without the most unequivocal stipulation, to reduce to the only construction, in which he can acquiesce, the article of the treaty.*

Before the President had received this rough draught of a memorial, and the form of an eventual ratification, therein referred to, he wrote to me on the 22d of July, thus:

“ IN my hurry, I did not signify the propriety of letting those gentlemen know *fully*, my determination with respect to the ratification of

\* This is a blank in the rough memorial.

† The secretaries and attorney-general.

the treaty ;—and the train it was in ;—but as this was necessary, in order to enable them to form their opinions on the subject submitted, I take it for granted that both were communicated to them, by you, as a matter of course.—The first, that is the conditional ratification, (*if the late order, which we have heard of, respecting provision-vessels, is not in operation*), may, on all fit occasions, be spoken of as my determination, unless from any thing you have heard, or met with since I left the city, it should be thought more adviseable to communicate farther with me on the subject ;—my opinion respecting the treaty, is the same now that it was, that is, not favourable to it,—but, that it is better to ratify it in the manner the Senate have advised, (*and with the reservation already mentioned*) than to suffer matters to remain as they are,—unsettled.—Little has been said to me on the subject of this treaty along the road I passed ; and I have seen no one since from whom I could hear much concerning it :—but from indirect discourses I find endeavours are not wanting to place it in all the odious points of view of which it is susceptible, and in some which it will not admit.”

The President's letter to me from Virginia, on the 29th of July, 1795, forms a connecting branch only of the subject ; but if it were omitted, the omission might be imputed to some improper motive.

It begins with announcing his determination to return almost immediately to Philadelphia ; and proceeds thus :

“ I am excited to this resolution by the violent and extraordinary proceedings which have, and are about taking place, in the northern parts of the union, and may be expected in the southern; because I think that the memorial,—the ratification—and the instructions, which are framing, are of such vast magnitude, as not only to require great individual consideration; but a solemn conjunct revision. The latter could not happen, if you were to come to this place; nor would there be that source of information to be had, as is to be found at, and continually flowing to, the seat of government :—and besides, in the course of deliberating on these great matters, the examination of official papers may, more than probable, be found essential: and these could be resorted to nowhere else.”

The next paragraph speaks of the inconvenience of an immediate return, but says, that “ whilst he is in office, he shall never suffer private convenience to interfere with what he conceives to be his official duties.”

He goes on thus :

“ I view the opposition, which the treaty is receiving from the meetings in different parts of the union in a very serious light. Not because there is *more* weight in *any* of the objections, which are made to it, than were foreseen at first ;—for there are *none* in *some* of them ; and *gross* misrepresentations in others.—Nor as it respects myself personally ; for this

shall have no influence on my conduct; plainly perceiving, and I am accordingly preparing my mind for the obliquy, which disappointment and malice are collecting to heap upon my character. But I am alarmed on account of the effect it may have on, and the advantage the French government may be disposed to make of, the spirit which is at work; to cherish a belief in them, that the treaty is calculated to favour Great Britain at their expence. Whether they believe or disbelieve these tales, the effect it will have upon the nation will be nearly the same: for whilst they are at war with that power, or so long as the animosity between the two nations exist, it will, no matter at whose expence, be their policy, and it is feared, it will be their conduct, to prevent us from being on good terms with Great Britain, or from her deriving any advantages from our commerce, which they can prevent, however much we may be benefitted thereby ourselves. To what length this policy and interest may carry them is problematical; but when they see the people of this country divided, and such a violent opposition given to the measures of their own government, pretendedly in their favour, it may be extremely embarrassing, to say no more of it.

"To sum the whole up in a few words. I have never, since I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis, which in my judgment has been so pregnant of interesting events; nor one from which more is to be apprehended; whether viewed on one side or the other. From New-York there now is, and I am told will further be, a counter current; but how formidable it may appear I know not;—if the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner universal, or that those of different sentiments are supine or intimidated; which would make the ratification a serious business indeed. But as it respects the French, even counter-resolutions, would, for the reasons I have already given, do little more than weaken, in a small degree, the effect those of the other complexion would have.

The remainder of the letter relates to the answers to be returned to the different town and other meetings on the treaty; with a postscript, desiring, that the confidential officers might "prepare their minds on the several subjects therein mentioned against he should arrive."

On the 31st of July, 1795, the President wrote to me the following letter from Mount Vernon.

ON Wednesday evening, I sent the packet, now under cover with this letter, to the post-office in Alexandria; to be forwarded next morning at the usual hour (4 o'clock) by the Baltimore mail; but behold! when my letter bag was brought back from the office, and emptied, I not only got those which were addressed to me—among which yours of the 27th was one—but all those which I had sent up the evening before.

I have to regret this blunder of the postmaster on account of the enclosures, some of which I wished to have got to your hands without delay, that they might have undergone the consideration, and acting upon, which was suggested in the letter which accompanied them.—On another account I am not sorry for the return of the packet; as I resolved there-

upon, and reading some letters which I received at the same time, to await your acknowledgment of the receipt of my letter of the 24th inst. before I would set out; as I should, thereby, be placed on a certainty whether your journey hither, or mine to Philadelphia, would, under all circumstances, be deemed most eligible; or whether the business could not be equally as well done without either, repeating now what I did in my letter of the 24th; that I do not require more than a day's notice to repair to the seat of government;—and that if you, and the confidential officers with you, are not clear in the measures which are best to be pursued on the several matters mentioned in my last, my own opinion is, and for the reasons there given, that difficult and intricate, or delicate questions, had better be settled there, where the streams of information are continually pouring in, than at any other place; and that I would set out accordingly.

To be wise and temperate, as well as firm, the crisis most eminently calls for; for there is too much reason to believe, from the pains which have been taken before—at—and since the advice of the Senate respecting the treaty, that the prejudices against it are more extensive than is generally imagined.—This, from men who are of no party, but well disposed to the government, I have lately learnt is the case.—How should it be otherwise? when no stone has been left unturned that could impress the people's minds with the most errant falsehoods—that their rights have not only been *neglected*, but absolutely *sold*;—that there are *no* reciprocal advantages in the treaty;—that the benefits are *all* on the side of Great Britain;—and, what seems to have more weight than all the rest, and is accordingly pressed, is, that this treaty is made with a design to oppress the French, in open violation of our treaty with that nation, and contrary, too, to every principle of gratitude and sound policy.

In time, when passion shall have yielded to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but in the mean while, this government in relation to France and England, may be compared to a ship between the rocks of Sylla and Charibdis.—If the treaty is ratified, the partisans of the French (or rather of war and confusion) will excite them to hostile measures; or at least to unfriendly sentiments—if it is not, there is no foreseeing *all* the consequences which may follow, as it respects Great Britain.

It is not to be inferred from hence, that I am, or shall be disposed to quit the ground I have taken; unless circumstances more imperious than have yet come to my knowledge, should compel it; for there is but one *straight* course in these things, and that is to seek truth and pursue it steadily.—The reason I mention them is to shew, that a close investigation of the subject is more than ever necessary; and that they are strong evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying the determination of government into effect with prudence, as it respects our own country; and with every exertion to produce a change for the better from G. Britain.

The memorial seems well designed to answer the end proposed; and by the time it is revised and new dressed, you will probably (either in the resolutions which are, or will be handed to me—or in the newspaper publications, which you promised to be attentive to) have seen all the objections against the treaty which have any real weight in them; and which may be fit subjects for representation in the memorial, or for the instructions;

or both.—But how much longer the presentation of the memorial can be delayed without exciting unpleasant sensations *here*, or involving serious evils *elsewhere*, you, who are at the scene of information and action, can decide better than I.—In a matter, however, so interesting and pregnant of consequences, there ought to be no precipitation: but on the contrary, every step should be explored before it is taken, and every word weighed before it is uttered, or delivered in writing.

The form of the ratification requires more diplomatic experience, and legal knowledge than I possess, or have the means of acquiring at this place, and therefore I shall say nothing on this head.

The identical memorial, which the President says seems well designed to answer the *end proposed*, and from which the foregoing extract was made, and the very form of a ratification to which he refers, are now in my possession.

The reason why the President thought it probable, that I might be on my way to Mount Vernon was, that I had intimated it to him. Messrs. Wolcott, Pickering, and Bradford had urged me to go thither, in order to close the business, and put an end to every expectation abroad that the President's purpose could now be changed. I had actually engaged a carriage for the purpose; but was prevented by a great influx of business from the President and other quarters.

Before the memorial returned to Philadelphia, Mr. Wolcott said something to me about delay in concluding the business; observing, that it would give the French government an opportunity of professing to make very extensive overtures to the United States, and thus embarrass the treaty with Great Britain. When I read the memorial to Col. Pickering in his office, he said, "This, as the sailors say, is throwing the whole up in the wind." The memorial after it was rendered more correct in language, retained the former determination against ratifying, except in the mode now expressed, if the provision-order was abolished. Although it expressly declares, that it is only a more particular disclosure of my conversation on the 13th instant, yet no observation was ever made in my presence or to my belief, by the President, that I had exceeded his intention. I spoke of his determination on the 12th of August 1795, when we were in consultation on the treaty,

and no objection was even hinted at. I also shewed to the President, on the morning of the 13th of August, 1795, the letters which had been written to Mr. Monroe, and to the other ministers, as follow. To Col. Monroe, July 14, 1795.

“ The treaty is not yet ratified by the President; nor will it be ratified, I believe, until it returns from England; if then. But I do not mean this for a public communication or for any public body or men. I am engaged in a work, which, when finished, and approved by the President, will enable me to speak precisely to you. The late British order for seizing provisions is a weighty obstacle to a ratification. I do not suppose that such an attempt to starve France will be countenanced.”

To all our foreign ministers, July 21, 1795.

“ When I inform you that the President has not yet ratified the treaty, his character will convince you, that nothing will deter him from doing what he thinks right; and that the final question lies open from causes, unconnected with any considerations but the interest and duties of the United States. He is at present in Virginia, and will doubtless very soon take his conclusive step. If I were permitted to conjecture, what that would be; I should suspect, that at any rate he would not sign it, until it should return from England, with the addition of the suspending article; and probably not even then, if a late British order for the capture of provisions going to France, should have been issued as we suppose, and increase the objections which have been lavished upon it.”

The purpose of this statement is to shew that the President, (notwithstanding he was at liberty to ratify, if he pleased, even after the declaration to Mr. Hammond, who would readily admit a recantation to that effect, and altho' I studiously kept him at liberty by my acts and writings,) went to Mount Vernon on the 15th of July, 1795, determined to adhere to the ground, which he had taken on the 13th, in my oral representation to Mr. Hammond, and came back on the 11th of August with the same determination, as far as I could discover. For, in addition to the preceding circumstances, on the evening of the 11th of August, I observed to him, in the presence of Messrs. Pickering and Bradford, that the sooner the memorial was revised by the gentlemen jointly, who were prepared with their opinions, the better; and he replied, that he supposed every thing of this sort had been settled.

ut I told him, that they were not, as Col. Pickering was for an immediate ratification; to which he said, " I told Mr. Randolph that I thought the postponement of ratification was a ruinous step;" or words tantamount.

I might confirm this, if necessary, by a very influential letter in the President's hands, dated the 10th or 14th of July, approved by him, and differing from my opinion, on the definitive step only in this respect; that the writer would have suspended the treaty, not by refusing to ratify, but by refusing to *exchange ratifications*, until an attempt was made to abolish the provision-order; and, if it miscarried afterwards, until our minister should receive further instructions.

That a change in the purpose of the President had taken place, will also appear by the change of expression between the memorial, which the President approved at Mount Vernon, and that delivered finally to Mr. Hammond. In the former, the Secretary of State proposes to communicate to the British minister more formally, more precisely, and more at large, the *suggestions* made in the conversation of the 13th of July, 1795. In the latter, he says, that in conformity with his assurance on the 13th of July, 1795, " he now communicates, by memorial, the *determination*, which the President of the United States has thought proper to adopt." The draught which I made in consequence of the change in the President's opinion, proves the constancy of my idea. It mentions the determination, which the President has, *upon farther reflection*, thought proper to adopt.

## TRANSLATION of Mr. Fauchet's Political Dispatch, No. 10.

LEGATION OF PHILADELPHIA.  
 FOREIGN RELATIONS.  
 Private Correspondence of the Minister }  
 on Politics.  
 No. 10.

Philadelphia, the 10th Brumaire, 3d year of  
 the French Republic, one and indivisible.  
 (October 31st, 1794.)

Joseph Fauchet, Minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic, near  
 the United States,

To the Commissioner of Foreign Relations.

CITIZEN,

1. The measures which prudence prescribes to me to take, with respect to my colleagues, have still presided in the digesting of the dispatches signed by them, which treat of the insurrection of the western countries, and of the repressive means adopted by the government. I have allowed them to be confined to the giving of a faithful, but naked recital of events; the reflections therein contained scarcely exceed the conclusions easily deducible from the character assumed by the public prints. I have reserved myself to give you as far as I am able a key to the facts detailed in our reports. When it comes in question to explain, either by conjectures or by certain data, the secret views of a foreign government, it would be imprudent to run the risk of indiscretions, and to give oneself up to men whose known partiality for that government, and similitude of passions and interests with its chiefs, might lead to confidences, the issue of which are incalculable. Besides, the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph alone throw a satisfactory light upon every thing that comes to pass. These I have not yet communicated to my colleagues. The motives already mentioned lead to this reserve, and still less permit me to open myself to them at the present moment. I shall then endeavour, Citizen, to give you a clue to all the measures, of which the common dispatches give you an account, and to discover the true causes of the explosion, which it is obstinately resolved to repress with great means, although the state of things has no longer any thing alarming.

2. To confine the present crisis to the simple question of the excite is to reduce it far below its true scale; it is indubitably connected with a general explosion for some time prepared in the public mind, but which this hot and precipitate eruption will cause to not carry, or at least check for a long time;—in order to see the real cause, in order to calculate the effect, and the consequences, we must ascend to the origin of the parties existing in the state, and retrace their progress.

3. The present system of government has created malcontents. This is the lot of all new things. My predecessors have given information in

detail upon the parts of the system which have particularly awakened clamours and produced enemies to the whole of it. The primitive divisions of opinion as to the political form of the state, and the limits of the sovereignty of the whole over each state individually sovereign, had created the federalists and the antifederalists. From a whimsical contrast between the name and the real opinion of the parties, a contrast hitherto little understood in Europe, the former aimed, and still aim, with all their power, to annihilate federalism, whilst the latter have always wished to preserve it. This contrast was created by the *Consolidators* or the *Constitutionalists*\*, who, being first in giving the denominations (a matter so important in a revolution) took for themselves that which was the most popular, although in reality it contradicted their ideas, and gave to their rivals one which would draw on them the attention of the people, notwithstanding they really wished to preserve a system whose prejudices should cherish at least the memory and the name.

4. Moreover, these first divisions, of the nature of those to be destroyed by time, in proportion as the nation should have advanced in the experiment of a form of government which rendered it flourishing, might now have completely disappeared, if the system of finances which had its birth in the cradle of the constitution, had not renewed their vigour under various form. The mode of organising the national credit, the consolidating and funding of the public debt, the introduction in the political economy of the usage of states, which prolong their existence or ward off their fall only by expedients, imperceptibly created a financing class who threaten to become the aristocratical order of the state. Several citizens, and among others those who had aided in establishing independence with their purses or their arms, conceived themselves aggrieved by those fiscal engagements. Hence an opposition which declares itself between the farming or agricultural interest, and that of the fiscal; federalism and antifederalism, which are founded on those new denominations, in proportion as the treasury usurps a preponderance in the government and legislation: Hence in fine, the state, divided into partisans and enemies of the treasurer and of his theories. In this new classification of parties, the nature of things gave popularity to the latter, an innate instinct, if I may use the expression, caused the ears of the people to revolt at the names alone of *treasurer* and *stockjobber*: but the opposite party, in consequence of its ability, obstinately persisted in leaving to its adversaries the suspicious name of *antifederalist*, whilst in reality they were friends of the constitution, and enemies only of the excrescences which financing theories threatened to attach to it.

5. It is useless to stop longer to prove that the monarchical system was interwoven with those novelties of finances, and that the friends of the latter favoured the attempts which were made in order to bring the constitution to the former by insensible gradations. The writings of influential men of this party prove it; their real opinions too avow it, and the journals of the Senate are the depository of the first attempts.

6. Let us, therefore, free ourselves from the intermediate spaces in which the progress of the system is marked, since they can add nothing to the proof of its existence—Let us pass by its sympathy with our regene-

\* *Constituans.*

rating movements, while running in monarchical paths—Let us arrive at the situation in which our Republican revolution has placed things and parties.

7. The antifederalists disembarrass themselves of an insignificant denomination, and take that of patriots and of republicans. Their adversaries become *aristocrats*, notwithstanding their efforts to preserve the advantageous illusion of ancient names; opinions clash, and press each other; the aristocratic attempts, which formerly had appeared so insignificant, are recollected: The treasurer, who is looked upon as their first source, is attacked; his operations and plans are denounced to the public opinion; nay, in the sessions of 1792 and 1793, a solemn inquiry into his administration was obtained. This first victory was to produce another, and it was hoped that, faulty or innocent, the treasurer would retire, no less by necessity in the one case, than from self-love in the other. He, emboldened by the triumph which he obtained in the useless inquiry of his enemies, of which both objects proved equally abortive, seduced besides by the momentary reverse of republicanism in Europe, removes the mask and announces the approaching triumph of his principles.

8. In the mean time the popular societies are formed; political ideas concenter themselves, the patriotic party unite and more closely connect themselves; they gain a formidable majority in the legislature; the abasement of commerce, the slavery of navigation, and the audacity of England strengthen it. A concert of declarations and censures against the government arises; at which the latter is even itself astonished.

9. Such was the situation of things towards the close of the last and at the beginning of the present year. Let us pass over the discontents which were most generally expressed in these critical moments. They have been sent to you at different periods, and in detail. In every quarter are arraigned the imbecility of the government towards Great Britain, the defenceless state of the country against possible invasions, the coldness towards the French Republic: the system of finance is attacked, which threatens eternising the debt under pretext of making it the guarantee of public happiness; the complication of that system which withholds from general inspection all its operations,—the alarming power of the influence it procures to a man whose principles are regarded as dangerous,—the preponderance which that man acquires from day to day in public measures, and in a word the immoral and impolitic modes of taxation, which he at first presents as expedients, and afterwards raises to permanency.

10. In touching this last point we attain the principal complaint of the western people, and the ostensible motive of their movements. Republicans by principle, independent by character and situation, they could not but accede with enthusiasm to the criminations which we have sketched. But the *excise* above all affects them. Their lands are fertile, watered with the finest rivers in the world: but the abundant fruits of their labour run the risk of perishing for the want of means of exchanging them, as those more happy cultivators do for objects which desire indicates to all men who have known only the enjoyments which Europe procures them. They therefore convert the excesses of their produce into liquors imperfectly fabricated, which badly supply the place of those they might procure by exchange. The *excise* is created and strikes at this consoling

transformation; their complaints are answered by the only pretext that they are otherwife inaccessible to every species of impost. But why, in contempt of treaties, are they left to bear the yoke of the feeble Spaniard, as to the Mississippi, for upwards of twelve years? Since when has an agricultural people submitted to the unjust capricious law of a people explorers of the precious metals? Might we not suppose that Madrid and Philadelphia mutually assisted in prolonging the slavery of the river; that the proprietors of a barren coast are afraid lest the Mississippi, once opened, and its numerous branches brought into activity, their fields might become deserts, and in a word that commerce dreads having rivals in those interior parts as soon as their inhabitants shall cease to be subjects? This last supposition is but too well founded; an influential member of the Senate, Mr. Izard, one day in conversation undisguisedly announced it to me.

11. I shall be more brief in my observations on the murmurs excited by the system for the sale of lands. It is conceived to be unjust that these vast and fertile regions shou'd be sold by provinces to capitalists, who thus enrich themselves, and retail, with immense profits, to the husbandmen, possessions which they have never seen. If there were not a latent design to arrest the rapid settlement of those lands, and to prolong their infant state, why not open in the west land offices, where every body, without distinction, should be admitted to purchase by a small or large quantity? Why reserve to sell or distribute to favourites, to a clan of flatterers, of courtiers, that which belongs to the state, and which should be sold to the greatest possible profit of all its members?

12. Such therefore were the parts of the public grievance, upon which the western people most insisted. Now, as the common dispatches inform you, these complaints were systematizing by the conversations of influential men who retired into those wild countries, and who from principle, or by a series of particular heart-burnings, animated dissidents already too near to effervescence. At last the local explosion is effected. The western people calculated on being supported by some distinguished characters in the east, and even imagined they had in the bosom of the government some abettors, who might share in their grievances or their principles.

13. From what I have detailed above, those men might indeed be supposed numerous. The sessions of 1793 and 1794 had given importance to the republican party, and solidity to its accusations. The propositions of Mr. Madison, or his project of a navigation act, of which Mr. Jefferson was originally the author, sapped the British interest, now an integral part of the financing system. Mr. Taylor, a republican member of the Senate, published towards the end of the session, three pamphlets, in which this last is explored to its origin, and developed in its progress and consequences with force and method. In the last he asserts that the decrepid state of affairs resulting from that system, could not but presage, under a rising government, either a revolution or a civil war.

14. The first was preparing: the government, which had foreseen it, reproduced, under various forms, the demand of a disposable\* force which might put it in a respectable state of defence. Defeated in this measure,

\* Disponible.

who can aver that it may not have hastened the local eruption, in order to make an advantageous diversion, and to lay the more general storm which it was gathering? Am I not authorized in forming this conjecture from the conversation which the Secretary of State had with me and Le Blanc, alone, an account of which you have in my dispatch, No. 3? But how may we expect that this new plan will be executed? By exasperating and severe measures, authorised by a law which was not solicited till the close of the session. This law gave to the one already existing for collecting the *excise* a coercive force which hitherto it had not possessed, and a demand of which was not before ventured to be made. By means of this new law all the refractory citizens to the old one, were caused to be pursued with a sudden rigor; a great number of writs were issued; doubtless the natural consequences from a conduct so decisive and so harsh were expected; and before these were manifested the means of repression had been prepared; this was undoubtedly what Mr. Randolph meant in telling me *that under pretext of giving energy to the government it was intended to introduce absolute power, and to mislead the President in paths which would conduct him to unpopularity.*

15. Whether the explosion has been provoked by the government; or owes its birth to accident, it is certain that a commotion of some hundreds of men, who have not since been found in arms, and the very pacific union of the counties in Braddock's field, a union which has not been revived, were not symptoms which could justify the raising of so great a force as 15,000 men. Besides the principles, uttered in the declarations hitherto made public, rather announced ardent minds to be calmed than anarchists to be subdued. But in order to obtain something on the public opinion prepossessed against the demands contemplated to be made, it was necessary to magnify the danger, to disfigure the views of those people, to attribute to them the design of uniting themselves with England, to alarm the citizens for the fate of the constitution, whilst in reality the revolution threatened only the ministers. This step succeeded; an army is raised; this military part of the suppression is doubtless Mr. Hamilton's, the pacific part and the sending of commissioners are due to the influence of Mr. Randolph over the mind of the President, whom I delight always to believe, and whom I do believe, truly virtuous, and the friend of his fellow-citizens and principles.

16. In the mean time, although there was a certainty of having an army, yet it was necessary to assure themselves of co-operators among the men whose patriotic reputation might influence their party, and whose luke-warmness or want of energy in the existing conjunctures might compromit the success of the plans. Of all the governors, whose duty it was to appear at the head of the requisitions, the governor of Pennsylvania alone enjoyed the name of Republican: his opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury and of his systems was known to be unfavourable. The secretary of this state possessed great influence in the Popular Society of Philadelphia, which in its turn influenced those of other states; of course he merited attention. It appears therefore that these men with o-

† This law was mentioned in the comment upon the laws of the last session inclosed in No. 9, of the correspondence of the minister.

thers unknown to me, all having without doubt Randolph at their head, were balancing to decide on their party. Two or three days before the proclamation was published, and of course before the cabinet had resolved on its measures, Mr. Randolph came to see me with an air of great eagerness, and made to me the overtures of which I have given you an account in my No. 6. Thus with some thousands of dollars the Republic could have decided on civil war or on peace! Thus the consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already their prices\*! It is very true that the certainty of these conclusions, painful to be drawn, will for ever exist in our archives! What will be the old age of this government, if it is thus early decrepid! Such, citizen, is the evident consequence of the system of finances conceived by Mr. Hamilton. He has made of a whole nation, a stock-jobbing, speculating, selfish people. Riches alone here fix consideration; and as no one likes to despised, they are universally sought after. Nevertheless this depravity has not yet embraced the mass of the people; the effects of this pernicious system have as yet but slightly touched them. Still there are patriots, of whom I delight to entertain an idea worthy of that imposing title. Consult Monroe, he is of this number; he had apprised me of the men whom the current of events had dragged along as bodies devoid of weight. His friend Madison is also an honest man. Jefferson, on whom the patriots cast their eyes to succeed the President, had foreseen these crises. He prudently retired in order to avoid making a figure against his inclination in scenes, the secret of which will soon or late be brought to light.

17. As soon as it was decided that the French Republic purchased no men to do their duty, there were to be seen individuals, about whose conduct the government could at least form uneasy conjectures, giving themselves up with a scandalous ostentation to its views, and even seconding its declarations. The Popular Societies soon emitted resolutions stamped with the same spirit, and who, although they may have been advised by love of order, might nevertheless have omitted or uttered them with less solemnity. Then were seen coming from the very men whom we had been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the system of the treasurer, harangues without end, in order to give a new direction to the public mind. The militia, however, manifest some repugnance, particularly in Pennsylvania, for the service to which they were called. Several officers resign; at last by excursions or harangues, incomplete requisitions are obtained, and scattered volunteer corps from different parts make up the deficiency. How much more interesting, than the changeable men whom I have painted above, where those plain citizens who answered the solicitations which were made to them to join the volunteers—"If we are required we will march; because we do not wish not to have a government, but to arm ourselves as volunteers would be in appearance subscribing implicitly to the excise system which we reprobate."

18. What I have said above, authorises then our resting on the opinion become incontestable, that in the crisis which has burst, and in the means employed for restoring order, the true question was the destruction or the triumph of the treasurer's plans. This being once established, let us pass over the facts related in the common dispatches, and see how the government or the treasurer will take from the very stroke which

\* Tarif.

threatened his system the safe opportunity of humbling the adverse party, and of silencing their enemies whether open or concealed. The army marched; the President made known that he was going to command it; he sat out for Carlisle; Hamilton, as I have understood, requested to follow him; the President dared not to refuse him. It does not require much penetration to divine the object of this journey: In the President it was wise, it might also be his duty. But in Mr. Hamilton it was a consequence of the profound policy which directs all his steps; a measure dictated by a perfect knowledge of the human heart. Was it not interesting for him, for his party, tottering under the weight of events without and accusations within, to proclaim an intimacy more perfect than ever with the President, whose very name is a sufficient shield against the most formidable attacks? Now what more evident mark could the President give of his intimacy than by suffering Mr. Hamilton, whose name even is understood in the west as that of a public enemy, to go and place himself at the head of the army which went, if I may use the expression, to cause his system to triumph against the opposition of the people? The presence of Mr. Hamilton with the army must attach it more than ever to his party; we see what ideas these circumstances give birth to on both sides, all however to the advantage of the secretary.

19. Three weeks had they encamped in the west without a single armed man appearing. However the President, or those who wished to make the most of this new manœuvre, made it public that he was going to command in person. The session of Congress being very near, it was wished to try whether there could not be obtained from the presses, which were supposed to have changed, a silence, whence to conclude the possibility of infringing the constitution in its most essential part; in that which fixes the relation of the President with the legislature. But the patriotic papers laid hold of this artful attempt: I am certain that the office of secretary of state, which alone remained at Philadelphia, (for while the minister of finance was with the army, the minister of war was on a tour to the Province of Maine, 400 miles from Philadelphia), maintained the controversy in favour of the opinion which it was desired to establish. A comparison between the President and the English monarch was introduced, who far removed from Westminster, yet strictly fulfils his duty of sanctioning; it was much insisted on that the constitution declares that the President commands the armed force: this similitude was treated with contempt; the consequence of the power of commanding in person, drawn from the right to command in chief (or direct) the force of the state, was ridiculed and reduced to an absurdity, by supposing a fleet at sea and an army on land. The result of this controversy was, that some days after it was announced that the President would come to open the approaching session.

20. During his stay at Bedford, the President doubtless concerted the plan of the campaign with Mr. Lee, to whom he left the command in chief. The letter by which he delegates the command to him, is that of a virtuous man, at least as to the major part of the sentiments which it contains; he afterwards set out for Philadelphia, where he has just arrived, and Mr. Hamilton remains with the army.

21. This last circumstance unveils all the plan of the Secretary; he presides over the military operations in order to acquire in the fight of his

enemies a formidable and imposing consideration. He and Mr. Lee the commander in chief, agree perfectly in principles. The governors of Jersey and Maryland harmonize entirely with them; the governor of Pennsylvania, of whom it never would have been suspected, lived intimately and publicly with Hamilton. Such a union of persons would be matter sufficient to produce resistance in the western counties, even admitting they had not thought of making any.

22. The soldiers themselves are astonished at the scandalous gaiety, with which those who possess the secret, proclaim their approaching triumph. It is asked, of what use are 15,000 men in this country, in which provisions are scarce, and where are to be seized only some turbulent men at their plough. Those who conducted the expedition know this; the matter is to create a great expence; when the sums shall come to be assested, no one will be willing to pay, and should each pay his assestment, it will be done in cursing the insurgent principles of the patriots.

23. It is impossible to make a more able manœuvre for the opening of Congress. The passions, the generous indignation, which had agitated their minds in the last session, were about being renewed with still more vigor; there was nothing to announce of brilliant successes which they had promised. The hostilities of Great Britain on the continent so long disguised, and now become evident, a commerce always harrassed, ridiculous negotiations lingering at London, waiting until new conjunctures should authorize new insults: such was the picture they were likely to have to offer the representatives of the people. But this crisis, and the great movements made to prevent its consequences, change the state of things. With what advantage do they denounce an atrocious attack upon the constitution, and appreciate the activity used to repress it; the aristocratical party will soon have understood the secret; all the misfortunes will be attributed to patriots; the party of the latter is about being deserted by all the weak men, and this complete session will have been gained.

24. Who knows what will be the limits of this triumph? Perhaps advantage will be taken by it to obtain some laws for strengthening the government, and still more precipitating the propensity, already visible, that it has towards aristocracy.

25. Such are, citizen, the data which I possess concerning these events, and the consequences I draw from them: I wish I may be deceived in my calculations, and the good disposition of the people; their attachment to principles leads me to expect it. I have perhaps herein fallen into the repetition of reflections and facts contained in other dispatches, but I wished to present together some views which I have reason to ascribe to the ruling party, and some able manœuvres invented to support themselves. Without participating in the passions of the parties, I observe them; and I owe to my country an exact and strict account of the situation of things. I shall make it my duty to keep you regularly informed of every change that may take place; above all I shall apply myself to penetrate the disposition of the legislature; that will not a little assist in forming the final idea which we ought to have of these movements, and what we should really fear or hope from them.

Health and fraternity.

Signed,

M. FAUCET.

*To the President of the United States.*

SIR,

NEVER until the 19th of August, 1795, could I have believed, that in addressing you, without the restraint of an official relation, I should use any other language, than that of a friend. From an early period of my life, I was taught to esteem you:—as I advanced in years, I was habituated to revere you:—you strengthened my prepossessions by marks of attention; and if by some others, you have been insidiously pampered with more lavish assurances of an affectionate attachment; from me you have experienced a sincere anxiety, to continue your reputation upon its *ancient* basis, the hearts of the people.

But the season is come, Sir, when, if my obligations to you have not been balanced by laborious and confidential services; the whole account is settled without ingatitude on my part.

Still however those very obligations, the very reputation which you have acquired, will cause it to be asked, why you should be suspected of acting towards me, in any other manner, than deliberately, justly, and even kindly? Painful as the history of facts is, it must be told. Before you saw Mr. Fauchet's letter, the British partisans had been industrious in disseminating the most poisonous falsehoods; and while I was absent at Rhode-Island they seized the advantage of uttering uncontradicted flanders; boasting and insisting, that in a controversy between us, *I must* be sacrificed. The hope, therefore, which remains to me, is, that truth when developed may face with success the influence of your character. For I hesitate not to pronounce, that you prejudged the question; that you ought to have withheld the impulse, which hurried you into a prejudication; and that he, who feels a due abhorrence of party-maneuvres, will form a conclusion honorable to myself.

That you prejudged my case, is proclaimed by your actions.—

On the evening of the 11th of August, '1795, Mr. Fauchet's letter was presented to you by Mr. Wolcott. At all hours of the day I was ready to obey your summons. On every day, except Sunday; and perhaps twice a day I had a private interview with you. Twice I spoke to you of the warmth, which Messrs. Wolcott and Pickering had discovered on the 12th, in the discussion of the treaty in your room, and which undoubtedly, as it now appears, sprang from a knowledge of that letter. On the 14th you vailed the meditated stroke by a visit at my house. On the 15th, you invited me, in the most cordial way, to dine with a party of chosen friends, and placed me at the foot of your table. On the 18th the same air of hospitality was assumed. But the system of concealment, which had been practised under the united auspices of the British minister, and the American secretary of the treasury, was not thought unworthy of your adoption: —Mr. Wolcott had been privy to the letter at least from the 28th of July, and the President of the United States from the 11th of August; and yet he had buried it at the bottom of his soul, until the 19th of August, when the final catastrophe seemed to be secure. Why was all this stratagem observed towards him, of whose fidelity you had never entertained a doubt? Although your advisers might have pledged themselves, for the pursuit of a particular plan, to others; although even *New-York* may have been the birth-place of the scheme; old habits of deference to the opinion of any man ought to have been discarded, when put in competition with justice. From this cause, from another, which will be hereafter noticed, or from a temper, which under the exterior of cool and slow deliberation, rapidly catches a prejudice, and with difficulty abandons it; you determined, that your first impressions could not be effaced: You held frequent consultations with Messrs. Pickering and Wolcott; you and they became centinels on all my words, all my gestures: And it being known, that I should renew in the debate upon the treaty my undissembled protestation against a rupture with France, it was too admirable an opportunity for culling a few atoms of testimony of French influence over me

to be lost by an untimely discovery of the letter. Was this open? Was this generous? Was it characteristic of an inquiry after truth; or was it not rather characteristic of a labour to defend before the world a judgment already fixed? It was in perfect unison with the events of the 19th of August; when your tribunal of inquiry had been sitting more than an hour before I was admitted; when I was received in the forms of a state-criminal; when those, who had been plotting against me, were invited to interrogate; when in military style I was directed to retire, until you should converse with them.

It was also in perfect unison with your own and Mr. Wolcott's indifference in obtaining the *necessary* lights. The principal parts of Mr. Fauchet's letter, so far as they affect me, depend for their explanation and illustration upon his dispatches No. 3 and 6. Without these the *facts* from which he draws his inferences, could not be divined by you; and your suspicions had for their foundation only his assertion of "*precious confessions*" from me; his "*conjecture*," contained in the statement No. 3, and his observations upon an unknown overtur in No. 6. You avow in your letter of Sept. 27, 1795, that "you have "never seen in the whole or in part, Mr. Fauchet's dis- "patches No. 3 and 6;" and "that you do not posseſs "any documents or knowledge of papers, which have "affinity to the subject in question." In like manner, Mr. Wolcott, whose agency with the British minister *on this occasion* has been so conspicuous, disclaims, on the 2d of October 1795, any "knowledge, whether they or "either of them (No. 3 and 6) have been seen by Lord "Grenville or Mr. Hammond." Thus not the smallest exertion was made to procure these documents; which would be naturally sought for by those, whose judgement was not pre-occupied.

Nor was this all. You undertook to decide for me, that *my* inquiries from Mr. Hammond for No. 3 and 6, must be unavailing; because you withheld from me Mr. Fauchet's letter, until Mr. Hammond had failed for Europe. This is no speculative complaint. For I have been assured, that a duplicate of No. 6, accompanied

the letter No. 10, from Philadelphia; but whether it was in or out of cypher cannot be ascertained farther, than that it was probably out of cypher, as No. 10 was in the common character.

Did Lord Grenville's high probity insure the sending of all papers, belonging to the subject? Did Mr. Hammond's peculiar candor render it impossible for him to suppress them? Or was Mr. Fauchet's accuracy so unquestionable, as to supersede the necessity of even asking for No. 3 and 6?

Of Lord Grenville I shall not speak, except in his political character towards the United States, and his conduct in this transaction. The arrogant observations which he made to Mr. Pinckney against the friends of France in our country; the displeasure expressed by the British cabinet on the letters, written to the National Convention, with your approbation; the dexterous perseverance, with which he has interwoven in the treaty every thing, adverse to France, which it was supposed, could be tolerated; and Mr. Fauchet's letter, being nine months old, when it was first exhibited to you;—these incidents ought to have reminded you, that the No. 3 and 6 deserved one short inquiry. They ought to have reminded you of the possibility, that instead of an anxiety in his lordship to maintain *our* government free from corruption, he might have been tempted, by the prospect of more effectually prepossessing you against the friends of France, to keep back those references. For he transmitted the letter No. 10 to Mr. Hammond, "*to be used to the best advantage for his Majesty's service.*" If any scope of thought had been indulged, it must have struck you, that, as Mr. Jay and Mr. Pinckney did not appear to have been acquainted with the letter, it was reserved by the British government for a critical moment, and that it ought to be attempted to supply the mutilations by a demand of the references.

Who was Mr. Hammond? In speaking of him too I shall confine myself to his political demeanor. Into his breast had been transfused the largest portions of his nation's hatred to all persons in the United States, who were

conceived to be attached to France. He denied to himself no opportunity of throwing an odium on them. You never will forget, Sir, his long, insolent, and contumelious neglect of the ordinary civilities, due from him, as a foreign minister, to yourself, as chief magistrate. You were no stranger to his personal irritation against me, for my friendship to France, for my remonstrances against Governor Simcoe's invasions; for my defence of the government of Rhode-Island in reclaiming the citizens of the United States, impressed and detained on board of the British ship Nautilus; and for the order, which in its operation ought to have prevented British ships of war from using our ports, as stations, from whence to prey upon the French. You often uttered your indignation at his many complaints, without a shadow of proof; and the lengths, to which he might be transported by the violence of his passion, were not easy to be defined. Was this the man, to be implicitly trusted for candor towards myself, or any friends to France?

Mr. Fauchet's letter bears upon the face of it reasons to question his accuracy. You have often questioned it, from the examination of his different dispatches to the government; as the answers to them prove.

To these evidences of your judgment being made up, without the references No. 3 and 6, I must add, that the *immediate* ratification of the treaty with Great Britain can be traced to no other source, than a surrender of yourself to the first impressions from the letter, which instantaneously governed you with respect to that instrument and myself. My narrative on this head has been explicit. I have asserted, and I again assert, that from the 13th of July to the 11th of August it was your *determination*, to ratify if the provision-order was arranged upon principles to your satisfaction; and *not to ratify* during its existence: and that whensoever in your letters you speak of ratification, you mean a future ratification upon condition. How your *determination* is to be reduced to mere *doubts*, I pretend not to solve.

The events, subsequent to the 11th of August, demonstrate how suddenly you yielded to the letter.

It had indeed been circulated at the coffee-house in the morning of that day, either by Mr. ~~Hammond~~ or his associates, that I was at the bottom of the town-meetings ; and that there was a conspiracy, of which I was a member, to destroy the popularity of the President, and to thrust Mr. Jefferson into his chair. Among the intemperate arguments of Mr. Pickering to urge you into an immediate ratification, one was, that the struggle to defeat the treaty was the act of a "*detestable and nefarious conspiracy.*" I resorted to my former arguments : that the treaty did not appear to me to warrant the provision-order : that if it did, it was ~~im~~missible, because you had sanctioned a letter on the 7th of September 1793, acknowledging a permission in Great Britain to exercise such a power, to be a cause of war to France : that we should be inconsistent in our discussions with the French minister ; because, when he remonstrated upon the extension of contraband by the treaty, it was answered, that we did not alter the law of nations ; but now we should desert what was contended to be the law of nations, in two letters to Mr. ~~Hammond~~ : that you would run the hazard of a war with France, by combining to starve her ; and that her discontents were the only possible chance remaining to the British partizans for throwing us into the arms of Great Britain, by creating a seeming necessity of an alliance with the latter power. By my advice the United States would also have been masters of all contingencies at the end of the campaign. To my unutterable astonishment, I soon discovered, that you were receding from your "*determination.*" You had been reflecting upon your course from the 26th of June to the 13th of July ; on the latter day you decided on it ; a communication was made to the British minister in conformity with it ; letters were addressed to our own ministers in conformity to it ; they were inspected by you, before you rescinded your purpose ; no imperious circumstances had arisen, except the strength of the popular voice, which would, according to ordinary calculation, *corroborate*, not *reverse*, your former resolution ; you assigned no new reasons for the new measures ; and you disregarded the an-

swer to Boston, although it had committed you upon a *special fact*, namely, a determination not to ratify during the existence of the provision-order. While I was searching for the cause of this singular revolution; and could not but remember, that *another opinion*, which was always weighty with you, had advised you not to *exchange ratifications*, until the provision-order should be abolished, or the American minister should receive farther instructions, if it were not abolished;—after duty had dictated to me an *acquiescence* in your varied sentiments, and I had prepared a memorial to Mr. Hammond, adapted to them;—after you had signed the ratification on the 18th of August; Mr. Fauchet's ~~paper~~ brought forth a solution of the whole affair. There it was, that Mr. Pickering's “*detestable and nefarious conspiracy*” was supposed to be found: there it was that the dark design of replacing you by another President was supposed to be found; there it was, that a corrupt attachment to France was supposed to be found; thence it was, that Messrs. Pickering and Wolcott wrought upon you with insinuations of perfidy in me; thence it was, that you were persuaded to lay aside all fear of a check from the friends of France;—thence it was, that the French cause and myself were instantaneously abandoned; thence it was, that you proceeded in a style, which according to the reports of your confidential officers, was intended to impose on me the alternative of *resignation or removal*; and it was from the knowledge of this intention, that Mr. Pickering made the chief clerk in the department of state the organ of a declaration to that effect—What else is all this, but *pre-judication*?

I now enter upon the proof of my second position; that you ought to have withheld the impulse, which hurried you into a *prejudication*; and this too, not from the rules of general justice alone, but from the peculiar circumstances of the case.

The groundwork of all the calumny is a letter from a foreign minister to his government. It could not, Sir, escape you, that to refute it, I must, in a great degree, if not altogether, undertake to prove a negative. A mem-

ber of the administration has gone so far, as to say, on this ground, that I *cannot* exculpate myself. Well might he triumph in this envenomed hope: for my chief resource was in an explanation from the writer himself. But where was the writer, when the letter was thought ripe for my crimination? Probably on the high seas, or in France, or at any rate three hundred miles distant. Mr. Fauchet had long quitted Philadelphia; and the frigate, which was to convey him to France, waited for nothing, but favourable weather, for passing the British ship Africa. Who was the writer? A minister, recalled by the enemies of his friends and patrons; personally disgusted with the secretary of state; and conscious of the danger of inconsistency. It was no great favour therefore to expect the suspension of your opinion, especially as, if I had miscarried in seeing Mr. Fauchet, I must for months have been inevitably deprived of his testimony.

The time when the letter crept from the pocket of the British minister, was exposed to very obvious animadversions. You had been informed of his eagerness to crown his mission by the consummation of the treaty, of which he was an affectionate admirer, and Lord Grenville had been the anxious parent. Mr. Wolcott, profuse in his responsibility for others, would seem, in his letter of October the 8th, to excuse Mr. Hammond from requesting or intimating, that the contents of the letter might be communicated to the President, and fathers it as his own suggestion, that it ought to be delivered to him for that purpose. The world cannot be deceived by this. Mr. Hammond understood the goodness of the soil, in which he was sowing the seed; and duly appreciated the fruit, which was to spring from it. He was convinced, and you must have been convinced, that he counted upon your being made a partner of the secret; and would have soon explained himself in that way, if Mr. Wolcott's patriotic ardor, to hurl a feeble dart at the republicans of the United States, had not anticipated him by a particular application. With this impression, it ought to have occurred, that Mr. Hammond might have chosen for the communication, the period when you refused the

ratification from a circumstance, principally relative to the French. I assert that he preferred this period; because he was instructed to use the letter for the benefit of his Majesty's service. He had long ago heard, that you generally suffered yourself to be governed by a majority of your council; and that a concert between Messrs. Wolcott and Pickering, who caught with joy the seeming authority to denounce the foes of the treaty, as a "detestable and nefarious conspiracy," and were perhaps furnished with some peculiar topics for your ear, would turn your mind to the revocation of your original intention. Considerations like these should have recommended real moderation, in deciding upon a mutilated instrument; and the inducement to moderation was heightened by a natural suspicion, that the suppression of the letter from me, until Mr. Hammond was on shipboard, arose from his reluctance to be interrogated concerning its references.

The facts speak too strongly to be resisted, and I must repeat them here. When was the letter delivered to Mr. Wolcott? On the 28th of July.—When was the letter communicated to you? On the 11th of August.—When did Mr. Hammond leave Philadelphia for New-York? On the 15th of August.—When did he actually sail from thence? On the 17th in the morning.—When was the letter exhibited to me? On the 19th at noon.

But let me allow, Sir, for a moment, that Mr. Fauchet's letter, instead of being stripped of its references, had vouched for the payment of money to me, as the reward of secret services to France. You ought even then to have paused, before you stooped to the concealment of it for eight days, and to the injurious treatment which I received from you on the 19th of August. You invited me, in a strain of the warmest friendship, to the office of Attorney-General. Unsolicited, you offered me the department of state. My friends were aware, that machinations would be carried on against me; but I relied upon my superiority to the shafts of party malice, and on your support. My conduct towards you; your knowledge of me; was a guarantee, that a corrupt collusion with a for-

eign minister was impossible. Have I not always, with firmness and without dissimulation contradicted any even of *your* opinions, in which I did not coincide? Did I not actually incur your displeasure by objecting to the appointment of Col. Hamilton, as envoy to London, for reasons which I afterwards communicated to himself; to the appointment of Mr. Jay, because it was a bad precedent, that a chief-justice should be taught to look up for *executive* honours, flowing from the head of it, while he retained his judicial seat; and to the granting of commercial powers to Mr. Jay? Did I advocate the appointment of any of my own friends? Have I not adhered to the principles which I marked out to myself in my letter of the 19th of April 1794\*? Was there no occasion, on which I ren-

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Philadelphia, April 19, 1794.

\* Dear Sir,

I CALLED upon Mr. Monroe, and obtained his promise to explain the manner of his procuring the extract, as it was in truth, without my privity, and against the rule of the office. But I find, that Mr. King was employed in the examination of the same books, at the same time; so that in this instance, the want of equal measure cannot upon any ground be suspected.

Your friendly remarks add to the many obligations, which I owe to you; and also present an opportunity, which I cannot forego, of unbosoming myself to you without reserve.

I have often said,—I still say—that nothing shall sway me, as nothing has yet swayed me, to depart from a long-settled determination, never to attach myself to party. I believe, that I might appeal to you, Sir—nay, I should not distrust an appeal to any man with whom I have acted, that this determination has been conscientiously pursued. What has been the consequence? I know it—that my opinions, not containing any systematic adherence to party, but arising solely from my views of right, fall sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other; and the momentary satisfaction, produced by an occasional coincidence of sentiment, does not prevent each class from occasionally charging me with infidelity. But I had much rather submit to this tax, than to the more painful sensations, which a contrary conduct would excite.

I am no less apprized, that my connections by friendship, by marriage, by country, and by similitude of opinions, where republicanism and good order meet, with the leaders of the southern politics, give birth to suspicions. But if I were here to enumerate the great subjects, which, since the organization of the government, have agitated the public mind, it would appear, that even those connections have not operated upon me, beyond the weight of their reason. They are inestimable to me; and while I retain a consciousness of my ability to resist an undue influence, I cannot deny the satisfaction, which I feel in maintaining them. And yet, Sir, there is one fact, of which I beg you to be persuaded; that with them I have no communication or matters of government which I would not have with others:—I converse freely, but without imparting official intelligence, which is not of an absolutely public nature:—I commit myself by no opinions—and above all I shall never attempt to use those persons, as engines of any measure, which is a favorite with me. While I was writing this last sentence, a question springs up “what view can I have?” The answer is, peace, liberty, and good government.

dered myself deeply obnoxious to those, whom you did not wish to provoke, merely by urging you to manifest your independence of all party, by submitting to the insolence of none? There was such an occasion. Did I ever attempt to ingratiate myself with others by soliciting offices for them? Disdaining to consult your prejudices, I have yet cherished your character, by advising you to measures, which consulted stable government, the temper of the people, and the neutrality which you had prescribed. I forbore to remove the suspicions which were uttered of my having relinquished republican ground, when I became Secretary of State; although I need only to have mentioned the constant tenor of my advice to you. I forbore this too, under circumstances not a little trying; for I soon perceived, that your popularity had been the fund, upon the credit of which all your acts, when unpalatable in themselves, had been made current, and that this fund was not eternal. In short, Sir, you *knew* enough of me, to

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When I contemplate the other party, I see among them men, whom I respect, and who, if their duplicity be not extreme, respect me. I see others, who respect no man, but in proportion to his subserviency to their wishes. Some of these are well informed, that I have opposed, in several instances, things which they had at heart. I have no reason to suspect Col. Hamilton of any unkind disposition towards me—he has none on my part with relation to himself—Even to your confidential ear have I never disclosed an idea concerning him, which he might not hear; and which, in many instances, and particularly a late one, he has not heard from my own mouth. But I have reason to suspect others—if you pause upon a measure, which they are anxious for, I am supposed to embarrass you with considerations of a popular kind.

But I have said enough—perhaps too much. Suffer me, however, to add one word more, of the sincerity of which I ask no other judge than yourself. Your character is an object of real affection to me: there is no judgment, no disinterestedness, no prudence, in which I ever had equal confidence. I have often indeed expressed sentiments contrary to yours. This was my duty; because they were my sentiments. But, Sir, they were never tinged by any other motive, than to present to your reflection the misconstructions, which wicked men might make of your views, and to hold out to you a truth of infinite importance to the United States, that no danger can attend us, as long as the persuasion continues, that you are not, and cannot become the head of a party. The people venerate you, because they are convinced, that you choose to repose yourself on them. Let me intreat you, only to look round the continent, and decide, if there be any other man but yourself, who is bottomed upon the people, independent of party? There is surely none; and the inference, which I submit to your candor, is, that the measures adopted by you, should be tried solely by your own pure and unbiased mind.

I have the honor to be,

Dear Sir,

With the most affectionate attachment and respect,  
Your most obedient servant,

E D M : R A N D O L P H .

The President.

demand that you should hesitate, before you shut your mind against inquiry.

Had Mr. Fauchet's letter been shewn to me in private, rather than in the presence of two men, personally irritated against me, well prepared for either function of counsellors or witnesses; and thus apparently elevated, while in your cabinet, by an ideal victory, the laurels of which, be they transitory or perpetual, belong to you alone:—had you observed towards me, the friend of the French cause, and one of those named in the letter of the French minister, the same delicate conduct, which you would have observed towards some of the enemies of the French cause if they had been named in an intercepted letter of the British minister:—had you been yourself—such as you were—when party dare not approach you:—I should have thanked you, and immediately gone in quest of the proofs which I now possess. Every official act was liable to your correction or prohibition; and if satisfied, you would have avoided your invincible repugnance to retract. But that letter has been greedily clutched for three objects; to insure the ratification of the treaty; to drive me from office; and to endeavour to destroy the republicans in the United States. The first is accomplished: the second is also accomplished, and was unnecessarily precipitated, since you were acquainted with my determination to resign at the beginning of the ensuing year: the third can never be accomplished, until the people shall forget their friends, and forget truth.

Resignation then was the path of honour. What! hold an office, to be administered under the hourly controul of him, who was thoroughly disposed to present humiliation to me in all its shapes; and would have prostrated the guidance of the department of state to a Secretary of the Treasury, and a Secretary of War, who, but a few weeks before, were thought by him, as but successors in *form* to the deliberative talents of their predecessors. Truly can I affirm, that not a single hour was ever brightened by the pleasures of the post; and I should have shaken off its irksome weight, at the close of the last year, had I obeyed my interest or inclination, instead of my attachment to

you. If indeed the affair had been less in the reach of inquiry from my resignation, I would not have resigned. But this is not the case. I defy an inquiry, howsoever backed by party, by management, or by influence. My countrymen will therefore be persuaded, that my resignation was dictated not by a dread of examination, but by the just pride of liberating myself from indignities.

It was incumbent on me to touch the two preliminary points; in order that I might enter into the analysis of Mr. Fauchet's letter, without the prejudice, which your character might impose on my cause, from a supposition that you had formed your judgment upon a calm and dispassionate investigation.—I renounce every other view. For I scorn to rest my defence upon the imbecility of others, rather than its own strength:—I scorn to take refuge in the sensibility of the public mind, rather than the purity of my own conduct. Let the defects therefore of others operate no further in my behalf, than to remove the impressions which malicious industry has circulated through the United States under the mantle of your name. I ask only that the letter may *now* be considered, as if it was, for the first time, introduced to public notice; and that the essential references, No. 3 and 6, to which you have been hitherto a stranger, may be coupled with that letter.

When I am called upon to prove a negative, it ought to be enough for me to deny the charges, until they are supported by better evidence, than the mere assertion of any foreign minister. Be it, however, otherwise;—I will prove it, as far as it is within the reach of proof.

*The first paragraph of Mr. Fauchet's letter\*.*

“ 1. The measures which prudence prescribes to me to take, with respect to my colleagues, have still presided in the digesting of the dispatches signed by them, which treat of the insurrection of the western countries, and of the repressive means adopted by the government. I have allowed them to be confined to the giving of a faithful, but naked recital of events; the reflections therein contained scarcely exceed the conclusions easily deducible from the character assumed by the public prints. I have reserved

\* The translation has been made by a gentleman, at my request, and delivered to the Printer, after I left Philadelphia. Having the French original only before me, I may not always translate alike in words; though the sense will doubtless be the same.

myself to give you as far as I am able a key to the facts detailed in our reports. When it comes in question to explain, either by conjectures or by certain data, the secret views of a foreign government, it would be imprudent to run the risk of indiscretions, and to give oneself up to men whose known partiality for that government, and similitude of passions and interests with its chiefs, might lead to confidences, the issue of which are incalculable. Besides, the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph alone throw a satisfactory light upon every thing that comes to pass. These I have not yet communicated to my colleagues. The motives already mentioned lead to this reserve, and still less permit me to open myself to them at the present moment. I shall then endeavour, Citizen, to give you a clue to all the measures, of which the common dispatches give you an account, and to discover the true causes of the explosion, which it is obstinately resolved to repress with great means, although the state of things has no longer any thing alarming.

The observation upon the "*precious confessions of Mr. Randolph*," involves the judicious management of the office. It implies no deliberate impropriety; and cannot be particularly answered, until particular instances are cited, unless it be by resorting to Mr. Fauchet's own explanation.

"On my arrival," says his certificate, "on this continent, the President gave me the most positive assurance, that he was the friend of the French cause. Mr. Randolph often repeated to me the same assurance. It was impossible for me not to give faith to it, (in spite of some public events relative to France which gave me some inquietude) especially when the secretary of state constantly took pains to convince me of the sensations of good-will of his government for my Republic. It was doubtless to confirm me in this opinion that he communicated to me, without authority, as I supposed, the part of Mr. Jay's instructions which forbade him to do any thing which should derogate from the engagements of the United States with France. My error, which was dear to me, was prolonged only by the continual efforts of Mr. Randolph to calm my fears both upon the treaty with England and upon the effect which it might produce on France. He was therefore far from confiding to me any act, any intention of government by virtue of any concert with me, or in consequence of any emolument received by him, or for the expectation or hope of any recompence promised, or with any other view than to maintain a good harmony between France and the United States. As to the communications which he has made to me at different times, they were only of opinions, the greater part, if not the whole of which, I have heard circulated as opinions. I also recollect that on one occasion, at least, which turned upon public measures, he observed to me, that he could not enter into details upon some of them, because by doing so he should violate the duties of his office. From whence I have concluded and believe that he never communicated to me what his duty would reprove. I will observe here, that none of his conversations with me concluded without his giving me the idea that the President was a man of integrity, and a sincere friend to France.

This explains in part what I meant by the terms, "his precious confessions." I proceed to other details relative thereto. I could allude only to explanations on his part upon matters which had caused to me some inquietude: And I have never insinuated, nor could I insinuate in that letter, that I suspected on his part even the most distant corruption. These explanations had equally for their object my different conversations upon Western affairs, as may be seen in the sequel of this declaration.

"When I speak in this same paragraph in these words, "Besides, the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph alone cast upon all which happens a satisfactory light," I have still in view only the explanations of which I have spoken above; and I must confess that very often I have taken for confessions what he might have to communicate to me by virtue of a secret authority. And many things which in the first instant I had considered as confessions were the subject of public conversations. I will say more. I will say, that I have had more than suspicions that certain confidences which have been made to me, were only to found my private opinions, and the intentions of the French Republic."

It is obvious that Mr. Fauchet labours in his letter to magnify to his government his penetration and skill in negociation. Nay, he may probably have thought, that he had acquired such an ascendancy over me, as to afford access to the secrets of the executive. But an example has not been, nor can be quoted, in which, while he was indulging the belief of confessions, I was not strictly within the line of duty.

Turn your eyes, Sir, to the situation of the American Secretary of State. The French minister was unquestionably sent upon an errand similar to that of every other foreign minister; to watch the movements of our government, the spirit of the people, and the events which arise. The Secretary of State is, on his part, to procure for the President from the minister every possible information of the affairs of France. It would be ridiculous and unavailing to pursue this object, but by the establishment of a confidence in the minister's breast. The surest mode of accomplishing it, was to inculcate the good-will of our government towards his country's cause; to repel his occasional complaints; to act candidly with him; and to be as frank in communications as our neutrality and the real secrets of the government would permit. Hence it has been a fixed usage for the Secretaries of State to seek conversations, or to continue them, with the French and indeed every other diplomatic resident.

You have been long privy to this usage; and frequently interrogated me, as to Mr. Fauchet's sentiments on a variety of matters. Were I to summon to my remembrance every thing, which I have imparted to you from him; the catalogue of what I might denominate *his* "precious confessions," would not perhaps be small. But very probably I might convert into confessions his authorized communications:—I might be deceived, as he was with respect to myself, when he accepted as a mark of my personal benevolence to his Republic, that portion of Mr. Jay's instructions, which was communicated to him, in substance, by your direction. That I never did for a reward, or emolument, received, promised, expected, or hoped for, communicate to him any act or intention whatsoever of the government of the United States; that I never did intentionally communicate to him, without your approbation, what was concealed from others: that, to the best of my belief, I never did inadvertently communicate to him any secret of the government; that I never had a conversation with him, which I conceived to be of importance, and did not relate to you, unless I were prevented by your absence, or some accident: and that I never uttered a syllable to him, which violated the duties of office; I assert, and to the assertion I am ready to superadd the most solemn sanction.

It will be necessary in this, and most of the other paragraphs of Mr. Fauchet's letter, to recollect his declaration, that, where he has not expressly quoted me, he does not speak from my authority. I shall not therefore in *this* place deny, as I might with truth, that I was the author of the remark at the close of the first paragraph; and for the same reason I shall not on future occasions deny, howsoever I might with truth, things not specially imputed to me.

*The second, third, and fourth paragraphs.*

" 2. To confine the present crisis to the simple question of the excise is to reduce it far below its true scale; it is indubitably connected with a general explosion for some time prepared in the public mind, but which this local and precipitate eruption will cause to miscarry, or at least check for a long time;—in order to see the real cause, in order to calculate the

effect, and the consequences, we must ascend to the origin of the parties existing in the state, and retrace their progress.

“ 3. The present system of government has created malcontents. This is the lot of all new things. My predecessors have given information in detail upon the parts of the system which have particularly awakened clamours and produced enemies to the whole of it. The primitive divisions of opinion as to the political form of the state, and the limits of the sovereignty of the whole over each state individually sovereign, had created the federalists and the antifederalists. From a whimsical contrast between the name and the real opinion of the parties, a contrast hitherto little understood in Europe, the former aimed, and still aim, with all their power, to annihilate federalism, whilst the latter have always wished to preserve it. This contrast was created by the *Consolidators* or the *Constitutionalists*\*, who, being first in giving the denominations (a matter so important in a revolution) took for themselves that which was the most popular, although in reality it contradicted their ideas, and gave to their rivals one which would draw on them the attention of the people, notwithstanding they really wished to preserve a system whose prejudices should cherish at least the memory and the name.

“ 4. Moreover, these first divisions, of the nature of those to be destroyed by time, in proportion as the nation should have advanced in the experiment of a form of government which rendered it flourishing, might now have completely disappeared, if the system of finances which had its birth in the cradle of the constitution, had not renewed their vigour under various form. The mode of organising the national credit, the consolidating and funding of the public debt, the introduction in the political economy of the usage of states, which prolong their existence or ward off their fall only by expedients, imperceptibly created a financing class who threaten to become the aristocratical order of the state. Several citizens, and among others those who had aided in establishing independence with their purses or their arms, conceived themselves aggrieved by those fiscal engagements. Hence an opposition which declares itself between the farming or agricultural interest, and that of the fiscal; federalism and antifederalism, which are founded on those new denominations, in proportion as the treasury usurps a preponderance in the government and legislation: Hence in fine, the state, divided into partisans and enemies of the treasurer and of his theories. In this new classification of parties, the nature of things gave popularity to the latter, an innate instinct, if I may use the expression, caused the ears of the people to revolt at the names alone of *treasurer* and *stockjobber*: but the opposite party, in consequence of its ability, obstinately persisted in leaving to its adversaries the suspicious name of *antifederalist*, whilst in reality they were friends of the constitution, and enemies only of the excrencences which financing theories threatened to attach to it.

Not being expressly quoted in these paragraphs I am bound to no reply upon them. The magnitude of the insurrection had indeed been announced by the President

\* *Constituans.*

in his proclamation of the 7th of August 1794, when he charged it with striking at "the very existence of government, and the fundamental principles of social order." Every passage in these paragraphs is plainly the fruit of Mr. Fauchet's own speculations.

*The fifth paragraph.*

" 5. It is useless to stop longer to prove that the monarchical system was interwoven with those novelties of finances, and that the friends of the latter favoured the attempts which were made in order to bring the constitution to the former by insensible gradations. The writings of influential men of this party prove it; their real opinions too avow it, and the journals of the Senate are the depository of the first attempts."

Here too Mr. Fauchet refers for his authority, not to myself, but to the writings of influential men, who patronised the financial system; to their avowed opinions; and to the journals of the Senate.

*The sixth paragraph.*

" 6. Let us, therefore, free ourselves from the intermediate spaces in which the progress of the system is marked, since they can add nothing to the proof of its existence—Let us pass by its sympathy with our regenerating movements, while running in monarchical paths—Let us arrive at the situation in which our Republican revolution has placed things and parties."

This paragraph is a mere introduction to some of those, which follow.

*The seventh paragraph.*

" 7. The antifederalists disembarrass themselves of an insignificant denomination, and take that of patriots and republicans. Their adversaries become *aristocrats*, notwithstanding their efforts to preserve the advantageous illusion of ancient names; opinions clash, and press each other; the aristocratic attempts, which formerly had appeared so insignificant, are recollected: The treasurer, who is looked upon as their first source, is attacked; his operations and plans are denounced to the public opinion; nay, in the sessions of 1792 and 1793, a solemn inquiry into his administration was obtained. This first victory was to produce another, and it was hoped that, faulty or innocent, the treasurer would retire, no less by necessity in the one case, than from self love in the other. He, emboldened by the triumph which he obtained in the useless inquiry of his enemies, of which both objects proved equally abortive, seduced besides by the momentary reverse of republicanism in Europe, removes the mask and announces the approaching triumph of his principles."

The intire complexion of this paragragh makes it so peculiarly Mr. Fauchet's own speculation, that it is almost useless to declare, that I never heard or believed, that the inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Hamilton was to drive him from office, whether he were guilty or innocent.

*The eighth paragraph.*

“ 8. In the mean time the popular societies are formed ; political ideas concenter themselves, the patriotic party unite and more closely connect themselves ; they gain a formidable majority in the legislature ; the abasement of commerce, the slavery of navigation, and the audacity of England strengthen it. A concert of declarations and censures against the government arises ; at which the latter is even itself astonished.”

From what source Mr. Fauchet collected the supposed astonishment of the government at the concert of declarations and censures, I cannot trace ; unless he imagined that the attacks upon the Popular Societies, in the year 1793, which were understood to proceed from officers then in the administration, were agreeable to the wishes of some branch of the government.

*The ninth, tenth, and eleventh paragraphs.*

“ 9. Such was the situation of things towards the close of the last and at the beginning of the present year. Let us pass over the discontents which were most generally expressed in these critical moments. They have been sent to you at different periods, and in detail. In every quarter are arraigned the imbecility of the government towards Great Britain, the defenceless state of the country against possible invasion, the coldness towards the French Republic : the system of finance is attacked, which threatens eternising the debt under pretext of making it the guarantee of public happiness ; the complication of that system which withholds from general inspection all its operations,—the alarming power of the influence it procures to a man whose principles are regarded as dangerous,—the preponderance which that man acquires from day to day in public measures, and in a word the immoral and impolitic modes of taxation, which he at first presents as expedients, and afterwards raises to permanency.

“ 10. In touching this last point we attain the principal complaint of the western people, and the ostensible motive of their movements. Republicans by principle, independent by character and situation, they could not but accede with enthusiasm to the criminations which we have sketched. But the *excise* above all affects them. Their lands are fertile, watered with the finest rivers in the world : but the abundant fruits of their labours run the risk of perishing for the want of means of exchanging them, as those more happy cultivators do for objects which desire indicates to all men who have known only the enjoyments which Europe procures them. They therefore convert the excess of their produce into liquors imper-

feebly fabricated, which badly supply the place of those they might procure by exchange. The *excise* is created and strikes at this consoling transformation; their complaints are answered by the only pretext that they are otherwise inaccessible to every species of impost. But why, in contempt of treaties, are they left to bear the yoke of the feeble Spaniard, as to the Mississippi, for upwards of twelve years? Since when has an agricultural people submitted to the unjust capricious law of a people explorers of the precious metals? Might we not suppose that Madrid and Philadelphia mutually assisted in prolonging the slavery of the river; that the proprietors of a barren coast are afraid lest the Mississippi, once opened, and its numerous branches brought into activity, their fields might become deserts, and in a word that commerce dreads having rivals in those interior parts as soon as their inhabitants shall cease to be subjects? This last supposition is but too well founded; an influential member of the Senate, Mr. Izard, one day in conversation undisguisedly announced it to me."

" 11. I shall be more brief in my observations on the murmurs excited by the system for the sale of lands. It is conceived to be unjust that these vast and fertile regions should be sold by provinces to capitalists, who thus enrich themselves, and retail, with immense profits, to the husbandmen, possessions which they have never seen. If there were not a latent design to arrest the rapid settlement of those lands, and to prolong their infant state, why not open in the west land offices, where every body, without distinction, should be admitted to purchase by a small or large quantity? Why reserve to sell or distribute to favourites, to a clan of flatterers, of courtiers, that which belongs to the state, and which should be sold to the greatest possible profit of all its members?"

These paragraphs contain nothing, which requires an answer from me.

*The twelfth paragraph.*

" 12. Such therefore were the parts of the public grievance, upon which the western people most insisted. Now, as the common dispatches inform you, these complaints were systematizing by the conversations of influential men who retired into those wild countries, and who from principle, or by a series of particular heart-burnings, animated discontentants already too near to effervescence. At last the local explosion is effected. The western people calculated on being supported by some distinguished characters in the east, and even imagined they had in the bottom of the government some abettors, who might share in their grievances or their principles."

Let him step forward, who can prove by a single fact, that any countenance was given by me to the insurrection.

*The thirteenth paragraph.*

" 13. From what I have detailed above, those men might indeed be supposed numerous. The sessions of 1793 and 1794 had given impor-

tance to the republican party, and solidity to its accusations. The propositions of Mr. Madison, or his project of a navigation act, of which Mr. Jefferson was originally the author, sapped the British interest, now an integral part of the financing system. Mr. Taylor, a republican member of the Senate, published towards the end of the session, three pamphlets, in which this last is explored to its origin, and developed in its progress and consequences with force and method. In the last he asserts that the decrepid state of affairs resulting from that system, could not but presage, under a rising government, either a revolution or a civil war.

This paragraph is only a brief narrative of some proceedings in Congress, and of three pamphlets which were published.

*The fourteenth paragraph.*

“ 14. The first was preparing : the government, which had foreseen it, reproduced, under various forms, the demand of a disposable\* force which might put it in a respectable state of defence. Defeated in this measure, who can aver that it may not have hastened the local eruption, in order to make an advantageous diversion, and to lay the more general storm which it was gathering ? Am I not authorized in forming this conjecture from the conversation which the Secretary of State had with me and Le Blanc, alone, an account of which you have in my dispatch, No. 3 ? But how may we expect that this new plan will be executed ? By exasperating and severe measures, authorised by a law which was not solicited till the close of the session. This law gave to the one already existing for collecting the *excise* a coercive force which hitherto it had not possessed, and a demand of which was not before ventured to be made†. By means of this new law all the refractory citizens to the old one were caused to be pursued with a sudden rigor ; a great number of writs were issued ; doubtless the natural consequences from a conduct so decisive and so harsh were expected ; and before these were manifested the means of repression had been prepared ; this was undoubtedly what Mr. Randolph meant in telling me that under pretext of giving energy to the government it was intended to introduce absolute power, and to mislead the President in paths which would conduct him to unpopularity.

To the reflection, that “ a revolution was preparing ; and that the government, which had foreseen it, reproduced, under various forms, the demand of a disposable force, which might put it in a respectable state of defence,” Mr. Fauchet was not conducted by any information from me. The first part of it originated with himself : For the latter whether it was right or wrong, he was probably indebted to the journals of the two

\* Disposable.

† This law was mentioned in the comment upon the laws of the last session inclosed in No. 9, of the correspondence of the minister.

houles of congress, to their debates, as published in the newspapers, and to public conversations. From some or all of these it appeared, that on the 11th of December, 1793, a bill was ordered into the house of representatives for completing the military establishment: that on the 31st of January 1794, it was rejected by the senate: that on the 20th of March 1794, the same bill was revived in that house under a new title: that on the 6th of May 1794, this bill was also lost by a disagreement between the two houses: that on the 12th of March 1794, a motion had been made in the house of representatives to increase the then military establishment of five thousand men by an addition of fifteen regiments of one thousand men each: that on the first of April 1794, a bill was brought in to increase the military establishment by adding twenty-five thousand instead of the fifteen thousand men; that on the 19th of May 1794, this bill was discussed, and the twenty-five thousand men being struck out, a motion was made for fifteen thousand, which being lost, another motion was made for ten thousand; which being also lost, the bill itself was totally rejected: that on the 24th of May 1794, a committee was appointed in the senate to report further measures for the defence of the United States: that on the 26th of May 1794, that committee reported an increase of ten thousand men to the military establishment: that on the 30th of May 1794, the bill which had passed the senate for that increase was rejected by the house of representatives: that a bill for the defence of the South Western frontier, by posts to be garrisoned with militia, and by patrols, or scouting parties of militia, passed the house of representatives on the 29th of May 1794; that the senate changed this bill entirely by an amendment for raising and adding a new legion of twelve hundred men, with the bounty of twenty dollars for each recruit: that on the 8th of June 1794, the bill and amendment were entirely lost; that on the very last day of the session, the 9th of June 1794, a bill was brought into the senate "to authorise the President in case he should *not* deem it expedient to employ any part of the then military establishment in the defence of

the south-western frontier, to raise, equip, and officer a new legion of twelve hundred men for that purpose; to be raised for three years, at the same pay and emoluments of the other troops, but with the bounty of twenty dollars to each recruit;" that this bill was read twice in the Senate; but on the question for its third and last reading, one of the members enforced the rule, that "no bill shall be read three times in the same day without unanimous consent;" and by his veto the bill was defeated. I shall give no opinion upon these proceedings; nor yet upon any messages from the executive, which might have suggested some of them. But I have been thus particular; to evince that Mr. Fauchet did not stand in need of *confessions* from any public officer.

Mr. Fauchet then asks, if he be not authorized by the conversation with me, mentioned in his dispatch No. 3, to *conjecture*, that the government, defeated in the demand of a disposable force, hastened the local eruption, in order to make an advantageous diversion, and to lay the more general storm, which it saw gathering? I deny, that he ever was authorized by any conversation whatsoever with me, to form even a *conjecture* of that kind; and with equal positiveness I also deny, every other conclusion, which he makes in this paragraph.

It is of no small weight to bear in mind, that the date of the conversation is fixed by Mr. Fauchet's certificate to have been in April 1794. I recollect to have had one with Mr. Fauchet and Mr. Le Blanc, about that time, on public matters, in which the French Republic was interested. But how was it possible for me to infer from any acts of the government, known to me, that it was hastening the local eruption? With the excise, the department of state was not concerned: it belonged to the treasury-department, and was there managed, I believe, even to the instructions for the issuing of process. It was in April 1794 understood by me to remain on its old footing, without any fresh irritation. As the law, to which Mr. Fauchet refers, did not pass until the 5th of June 1794, and he wrote his letter on the 31st of October following, you will perceive, that he blends two dif-

ferent dates together, for he deduces from a conversation in April, that means of coercion were provided beforehand, when those very supposed means were provided, according to his own account, only by the law, which is found to have passed two months afterwards. If exasperating and severe measures were contemplated in April, to be enforced by a then future law, I was an utter stranger to them. Besides, Mr. Fauchet does not seem to have had the dispatch No. 3 before him, when he wrote in October; as in the concluding sentence of the paragraph he gives, what he deems to be the synonymous meaning, not the words themselves; nor yet an accurate view of the conversation. But if the very words had been as unqualified, as he states, they would not warrant his conclusion; especially, when at the beginning of the next paragraph he doubts, whether the commotion was provoked by the government, or produced by chance.

Before, however, I examine the dispatch No. 3, let me concener the actual slate of things in April 1794; in order that I may compass the general scope of the conversation, and thus contribute to explain it.

Notwithstanding Mr. Fauchet was sent to replace Mr. Genet, he shews in this very letter, No. 10, that his communications were links of the chain of intelligence, which had been carried on by his predecessors. Having incorporated into his own family the members of Mr. Genet's; and hearing of a particular attention, which was paid to all the applications from the British minister, he entered into his diplomatic career, with uncertainties, and unpleasant sensations towards our government. You were aware of this danger; for when he was introduced to you on the 22d of February 1794, you poured forth the strongest language of affection to the French cause. France was then flushed with victory. An obnoxious minister had been recalled at your instance. You expected a war with Great Britain. In short you declared to me, that the French government must be cultivated with assiduity and warmth. In spite of all my efforts to pursue your wishes, I discovered in a few weeks, that suspicions were lurking in his bosom. 1. His manner indicated,

that he doubted the sincerity of your professions in favour of his country, and was anxious to determine, how far you were republican.—2. It was riveted in his judgment, that some very influential gentlemen around you, were, and had expressed themselves to be, hostile to its cause.—3. He believed, that extreme rigour had been practised upon French cruizers and French prizes, under instructions from the treasury-department; and that great indulgence had been allowed to British ships.—4. He believed, that in your very cabinet, snares were laid to detach you from France, and to ally the United States to Great Britain.—5. He believed, that the government had its mysteries, which led to the holding of a fair *language* to France, and to the substantial *acting* with partiality for Great Britain; or (to use an expression in one of his letters) that the federal officers were all *fire* to do, what should be pleasing to England; and all *ice* to France.—6. He had heard the charges made in public discourses, that some members of the government considered our constitution, as a *mére* stepping-stone to something else; not less than a monarchy, which might not be so friendly to a French Republic, as an American Republic\*.—7. He believed, that he saw in a bill, depending before Congress, an instrument for this purpose, and for the harrassing of the French cause.—8. He believed, that the affairs of France and the spirit of the American people were mis-

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\* Extract from the instructions to Col. Monroe, when he went to France as Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States; which were approved by the President.

“ If we may judge from what has been at different times uttered by Mr. Fauchet, he will represent the existence of two parties here, irreconcileable to each other;—one republican, and friendly to the French revolution; the other monarchical, aristocratic, Britannic, and anti-Gallican: that a majority of the House of Representatives, the people, and the President are in the first class; and a majority of the Senate in the second. If this intelligence should be used, in order to inspire a distrust of our good-will to France; you will industriously obviate such an effect,” &c.—

represented to you, and distorted.—9. He wavered, as to your perseverance in a resentment of the British outrages.—10. He was alarmed at the projected mission of Mr. Jay.—And 11. He distantly, though delicately hinted a fear, lest the political divisions in the United States might weaken the government, and excite a considerable conflict.—For ideas like these, he wanted no aid from a secretary of state. Public rumour was a fruitful nursery. If I have not occasionally intimated these things to you, none have been designedly concealed from you.—Many of them you have undoubtedly received from my mouth.

Silence was not my course. It was pre-eminently my duty, in April 1794, not to suffer France, to whom we owed so much, to be in suspense as to our predilection for Great Britain, from whom we had experienced, and were experiencing, every oppression.

In choosing my measures, I had a safe clue in the position of affairs, as seen and felt by yourself.—1. Your message to Congress, on the 5th of December 1793, announces an unfriendly temper to Great Britain.—2. Your nomination of Mr. Jay implies it in itself—you always professed—and your letter to me on the 15th of April 1794 proves, that if Great Britain did not redress our complaints in a reasonable time, war was in your opinion to be the consequence. That letter thus expresses your sentiments upon the draught of the message, nominating Mr. Jay: “ My objects are to prevent a war, *if* justice can be obtained by fair and strong representations (to be made by a special envoy) of the injuries, which this country has sustained from Great Britain, in various ways:—to put it in a complete state of military defence—and to provide *eventually* such measures, as seem to be now pending in Congress, for execution, if negotiation in a reasonable time proves unsuccessful.”—3. Your instructions to Mr. Jay had reference to an alliance with Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, against Great Britain, if our differences with her should not be adjusted.—4. Your instructions to Col. Monroe, which were sketched about this time, to be ready for any person, who should be appointed, command him, to “ let it be seen, that in

*case of war with any nation upon earth*" (an expression absolutely aimed at Great Britain) "we shall consider France as our first and natural ally." In these instructions are many other fervent professions to France.

—5. The plundering under the British instructions of the 6th of November 1793, and the stirring up of the Indians had drawn forth in the house of representatives various propositions of reprisal.—6. That house was indisputably attached to France.—7. Your orders; your letters; your speeches; breathed enmity to Great Britain and affection to France. You even excluded from your public room, men who were obnoxious to France.

By these facts, my conduct towards Mr. Fauchet was guided.—1. I urged upon him your declaration at his reception, that you were a friend to the cause of the French people; and, as he expresses it in his letter No. 10, "truly virtuous, and the friend of your fellow-citizens and of principles."—2. I bade him to rely on YOU; to disregard the suggestions of your being influenced by any *subordinate ministers* against France; and to apprehend nothing from *them*, while *you* were steadfast.—3. I exerted myself to satisfy him, that he complained without reason of severity upon the French cruisers; and the same arguments have been since extended in letters approved by you.—4. I represented to him, that, if snares were laid for you, you would escape from them; and more particularly if their object was the abandonment of France, and an adherence to Great Britain: that although like other men, who do not mix with the world, you might be sometimes misled, your industry and discernment would protect you from traps.—5. I denied, that the actions and professions of our government in regard to France were at variance; and I have often denied it in writing.—6. As to the conversion of our government into a monarchy, I stated, that this would not be done with your assent. For while you were desirous of rendering it stable only and energetic; I did not undertake to answer for the views of every man, who, under this pretence, might be willing to snatch something more; but I was confident, that you would not thus commit your popularity.—7. It must, I

think, have been subsequent to the time of the conversation, alluded to in No. 3, that I commented upon the bill which seemed to affect him so deeply; and that I assured him, that from your yielding to the remarks which I made to you upon it, he had an absolute security against the abuse of the powers confided to you.—8. I had no data, upon which to contradict his opinion, that the affairs of France, and the spirit of the American people might have been disfigured to you. But you will do me the justice to acknowledge, that when I spoke to you of the one or the other, I disengaged from you no truth, howsoever unpalatable, and I was always free to declare in your presence, that I never would.—9. I did not disguise my persuasion that nothing short of the most ample restitution and compensation would atone with you for the outrages of Great Britain. This was a justifiable expedient for calming Mr. Fauchet's fears on the mission of Mr. Jay.—10. In my endeavours to refute his estimate of the prevailing political divisions; I certainly did place much of my hope on you. Having often without reserve told you, that as long as you were superior to party, party would be impotent, and unable to perpetrate mischief, I have very probably uttered an expectation of acquiring with you influence enough, to prevail on you to step forth in opposition to any set of men, who should seek to aggrandize themselves at the expence of the constitution, or of the people.

If in all this I have erred, it is mere error;—but the error is not mine. It was derived from the spirit of your own movements, and our political prospects in April 1794. But it was not an error. It was a sound and honest policy: it was an indispensable one for maintaining harmony with France: it was rendered indispensable by the crisis, which had been forced upon Mr. Fauchet's mind, from the conviction, that artifice and hostility to republicanism were tearing the United States asunder from France. It was the policy of the *people* of the United States. Had the threatened war with Great Britain been realized; then this policy would have shone forth with lustre: then would the reverse have been warmly

reprehended. Had it not been observed; you would probably have long ago heard from France, murmurs which it might have been difficult to appease.

The foregoing observations have anticipated much of the attention due to the dispatch, No. 3. But it is proper to subjoin a few more particular remarks; because it is not a correct statement of the conversation; and is evidently defective, in omitting the part which Mr. Fauchet himself had in it, and in not exhibiting what I said as it really was,—an answer to the objections, advanced by him. His certificate too, although it cannot fail to be satisfactory to the people of the United States, has been less explicit, than it would have been, had it been in my power to have interrogated him upon its several parts, after it was composed.

That I was always deeply affected by the very possibility of a conflict between the parties in the United States, my letter to you in June 1792, and my constant declarations to you are a decided testimony. That intelligence of the existence of party-bitterness came to Mr. Fauchet through other channels, than myself, is notorious to those who have read the newspapers. Or, if it were necessary to demonstrate its publicity, I might quote a sentence in a paper, written at the beginning of the year 1791, for your use, and approved by you. “ It is certainly much to be regretted, that party-discriminations are so far geographical as they are; and that ideas of a severance of the union are creeping in both north and south.”

Without pretending to recollect the minutiae of the conversation, I avow, that I did hope to acquire an influence every day on your mind; and I will unfold the grounds of my hope; the means which I adopted for its accomplishment; and my final object.

You will acknowledge, Sir, I am sure, that I never attempted to depreciate in your esteem any of my colleagues in office; nor ever to magnify or blazon any merit of my own. The species of influence therefore, to which I directed my labours, was not that of raising myself on their ruins.

I came from Virginia as attorney-general of the Uni-  
† L

ted States, irresistibly impelled by the friendship of your invitation. I was ushered by you into the most confidential business; and, I believe, without the privity of the heads of departments. You connected me with you still more in the year 1793; and afterwards pressed me into another office, which I did not covet, and which I would not have accepted, had I not been governed by my affection for you, my trust in your republicanism, and your apparent superiority to the artifices of my enemies.

These germs of confidence, unequivocally disclosed by you, I did indeed cherish. But how? By art or management? No, Sir. By telling you the truth, without hesitation; without a momentary acquiescence in the prejudices of any man; by defending your character with zeal; and by advising measures, which should spread over the President of the United States, the glowing colours, in which General Washington had been painted to mankind.

Nor was my object less honourable than my means. You have my opinion under my hand, that while you should be untainted by the suspicion of being a favourer of party, your name would be a bulwark against party-rage. My hope therefore of acquiring influence was to put intestine convulsion at defiance, by persuading you to abhor party. You cannot believe, that I ever manœuvred with you for any emolument to myself: nor that I was an advocate for France, but by plain dealing and frankness, which her enemies might curse, but could not criticize.

Lest the trifling circumstance of visiting you should be wrought up by the malignant into a scheme of seduction; the admonition, which Mr. Fauchet ascribes to me, must not pass without a comment. As an artifice, it is too paltry to be dwelt upon. This probably was the truth of the case. It is a tribute of respect from foreign ministers to our chief magistrate, to wait on him at proper intervals. Mr. Fauchet was anxious to learn, how private visits were to be regulated. I could not forget, how much his predecessor had absented himself from you, even before the rupture; and I probably recommended to him to perform this official civility; with the additional assurance,

that he would be received in an easy style, whensoever he should be disposed to a private visit. Is it not an indication of a propensity to swell little matters, thus to interweave them in a formal political dispatch?

In whatsoever shape the drawing the bands of the two nations closer may have been advised, I remember not. But I was always watchful in repelling the imputation of neglect to embrace the overtures of a commercial treaty. It was natural for me, at the juncture of Mr. Jay's mission, to efface every idea of an indifference to an improved commercial connection with France. In a word, Sir, when you combine Mr. Fauchet's own admission, that I refused some information, as being contrary to my duty to be divulged, and that he did not fulfil a promise, as he says, to burn a particular paper, (which, however, was delivered under your direction); the dispatch No. 3, is sufficiently confronted by his certificate or my own assertion.

*The fifteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.*

“ 15. Whether the explosion has been provoked by the government; or owes its birth to accident, it is certain that a commotion of some hundreds of men, who have not since been found in arms, and the very pacific union of the counties in Braddock's field, a union which has not been revived, were not symptoms which could justify the raising of so great a force as 15,000 men. Besides the principles, uttered in the declarations hitherto made public, rather announced ardent minds to be calmed than anarchists to be subdued. But in order to obtain something on the public opinion prepossessed against the demands contemplated to be made, it was necessary to magnify the danger, to disfigure the views of those people, to attribute to them the design of uniting themselves with England, to alarm the citizens for the fate of the constitution, whilst in reality the revolution threatened only the ministers. This step succeeded; an army is raised; this military part of the suppression is doubtless Mr. Hamilton's, the pacific part and the sending of commissioners are due to the influence of Mr. Randolph over the mind of the President, whom I delight always to believe, and whom I do believe, truly virtuous, and the friend of his fellow-citizens and principles.

“ 16. In the mean time, although there was a certainty of having an army, yet it was necessary to assure themselves of co-operators among the men whose patriotic reputation might influence their party, and whose luke-warmness or want of energy in the existing conjunctures might compromit the success of the plans. Of all the governors, whose duty it was to appear at the head of the requisitions, the governor of Pennsylvania alone enjoyed the name of Republican: his opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury and of his systems was known to be unfavourable,

The secretary of this state possessed great influence in the Popular Society of Philadelphia, which in its turn influenced those of other states; of course he merited attention. It appears therefore that these men with others unknown to me, all having without doubt Randolph at their head, were balancing to decide on their party. Two or three days before the proclamation was published, and of course before the cabinet had resolved on its measures, Mr. Randolph came to see me with an air of great eagerness, and made to me the overtures of which I have given you an account in my No. 6. Thus with some thousands of dollars the Republic could have decided on civil war or on peace! Thus the consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already their prices\*! It is very true that the certainty of these conclusions, painful to be drawn, will for ever exist in our archives! What will be the old age of this government, if it is thus early decrepid! Such, citizen, is the evident consequence of the system of finances conceived by Mr. Hamilton. He has made of a whole nation, a stock-jobbing, speculating, selfish people. Riches alone here fix consideration; and as no one likes to despise, they are universally sought after. Nevertheless this depravity has not yet embraced the mass of the people; the effects of this pernicious system have as yet but slightly touched them. Still there are patriots, of whom I delight to entertain an idea worthy of that imposing title. Consult Monroe, he is of this number; he had apprised me of the men whom the current of events had dragged along as bodies devoid of weight. His friend Madison is also an honest man. Jefferson, on whom the patriots cast their eyes to succeed the President, had foreseen these crises. He prudently retired in order to avoid making a figure against his inclination in scenes, the secret of which will soon or late be brought to light."

The meeting at Braddock's field was announced in every newspaper: and wore too formidable an aspect to be called pacific. When it was determined to raise an army, I proposed the augmentation from 12,500 to 15,000 men; hoping that the unhappy people would be intimidated by so large a force, and the introduction of a corps of riflemen under General Morgan, whose name was reported to be a terror to them. It was wise to overawe them; for had they, in some rash moment, made battle, allured by a false comparison of their strength and situation with the power which was marching against them, still greater bodies of troops would have been assembled, and war would have raged with all its severities.

After Mr. Fauchet's declaration, that he does not speak from me, except where he particularly quotes me, it will scarcely be required of me to deny, that Mr. Hamilton's

\* Tarif.

ideas, or my own, in consultation with you, were communicated by me to him ; or yet, that the gentlemen, who were to appear at the head of the requisitions, or any others, associated in the popular societies, were ever named by me to him, in reference to the insurrection. But I do deny the latter, upon the best of my recollection ; and upon the further ground, that I had not the smallest authority for so naming them. I also deny the former ; and can affirm, that it was a subject of conversation in Philadelphia, but not through my means, that your advisers were divided in opinion as to the immediate marching of the militia.

Howsoever fashionable it may have been for officers in the federal government to form political connections with influential persons in the state governments, I had formed none such. But it is said in Mr. Fauchet's letter, that I was at the head of those, who balanced in deciding upon the part to be taken. Being almost an entire stranger to the inhabitants in the western counties of Pennsylvania, I could have few personal regards ; and I will not waste time in proving, what you well know, that order and good government have been always near to my heart. Upon what then could I balance ? The tenor of my opinions on that event I will now retrace.

When the violence at Col. Neville's house, on the 17th of July, 1794, and the commotion at Braddock's field were ascertained, I concurred with the other gentlemen of the administration, in the treasonableness of those acts, and in the necessity of resorting to the militia, if the laws were inadequate. Affidavits, letters, and a variety of papers were laid before you, to establish the existence of an insurrection ; and although I doubted, whether a judge would, upon *them*, *at that time*, and under the *then circumstances* grant a certificate of insurrection ; yet I agreed, that those documents ought to be submitted to judicial cognizance. At a conference, held on the first Saturday in August, 1794, between yourself and Governor Mifflin, and the the federal and state officers, it was observed, that even if the insurrection were confined to the four western counties of Pennsylvania,

the militia, which could be procured from thence, at that stage of the affair, would probably be unequal to the task of subduing the insurrection: that the insurgents, being upwards of sixty thousand souls, had friends elsewhere: and that a letter had been received from Kentucky, giving an account of the British government fomenting disturbances there. The affidavit of a person from Pittsburg was read, corroborating the suspicions, that the British were abetting the insurgents. Well do I remember my remark; that, if the British were at the bottom of the convulsion, it took a serious and very important direction; since, among the reasons for suspending the settlement at Presqu' isle, the apprehension of them was one. To shew my own impression of British interference in the western troubles, I refer to the following passage in my letter to you of the 5th of August, 1794.—

“ If the intelligence of the overtures of the British to the western counties be true, and the inhabitants should be driven to accept their aid; the supplies of the western army—the western army itself may be destroyed; the re-union of that country to the United States will be impracticable; and we must be engaged in a British war. If the intelligence be probable only; how difficult will it be to reconcile the world to believe, that we have been consistent in our conduct; when, after running the hazard of mortally offending the French by the punctiliose observance of neutrality;—after deprecating the wrath of the English by every possible act of government; after the request for the suspension of the settlement at Presqu' isle, which has in some measure been founded on the possibility of Great Britain being roused to arms by it; we pursue measures, which threaten collision with Great Britain, and which are mixed with the blood of our fellow-citizens.” To shew, that the governor of Pennsylvania thought the British movements to be of some weight, I refer to this expression in his first letter to you.—“ Nor in this view of the subject ought we to omit paying some regard to the ground for suspecting, that the British government has already, insidiously and unjustly attempted to seduce the citizens on our western frontier from their duty; and

we know, that in a moment of desperation, or disgust, men may be led to accept that, as an asylum, which under different impressions, they would shun as a snare." To shew, that the federal commissioners deemed the report as to the British worthy of inquiry; and that they were actually enticing our citizens for one purpose at least, I refer to a passage in Mr. Bradford's letter on the 17th of August, 1794.—" I forgot to mention, that I have not been able to discover any inclination in the insurgents to avail themselves of British protection: but Mr. — informs me, that he has direct intelligence, that about the last of July, two men from Detroit appeared in Washington country, to get an association to go and settle lands at the mouth of the Cayahoga; and that at the time his informant saw the paper, there were about four hundred names subscribed. He believes, they are at present on the waters of Buffaloe Creek." To shew your own sense of British interference in the insurrection, I refer to an extract from my letter to Mr. Jay, on the 18th of August, 1794, approved by yourself.—" We cannot add upon *proof*, that British influence has been tampering with the people of Kentucky, and of the neighbourhood of Pittsburgh, to seduce them from the United States, or to encourage them in a revolt against the general government. It has however been boasted of by them, and an expectation of such support is suspected to have been excited in the breasts of some." I will not say, that the government did wrong, in discarding all scruples with respect to British hostility. But I was prompted to write to you my letter\* of the 5th of August 1794, against the *immediate* operation of the militia, by this, among other considerations; that I heard an influential member of your administration wish, that the people, assembled at Bradock's field, had burnt Pittsburgh, as they threatened; and I was apprehensive, that as soon as the first step of military force was taken, you might be pushed to *march* the militia, notwithstanding the commissioners should report, as in fact they flattered themselves on the 21st of August,

\* See Appendix.

1794, that opposition to the laws would cease. Was not this the meaning of a declaration in your presence, at the abovementioned conference, that it was not enough to restore things to the state, in which they were six weeks before? But I united in the advice of the 25th of August, 1794, for marching the militia. If then to declare without reserve, that the militia must be employed to support the laws, provided they could not be executed by the officers of the law; to be solicitous to avert a civil war; and save, if possible, a million of dollars to the United States; to be cautious in the expenditure of money, for which there had been no appropriation; and to convince the people, that every conciliatory plan had been exhausted, in warding off the emergency;—if this be to balance, then did I balance, not otherwise.

The day, on which I visited Mr. Fauchet, was about the 5th of August, 1794, after the first proclamation was *ordered*. He was at his country-house on the Schuylkill; I was never there but once; and then I staid only for twenty minutes—a short space for an overture of conspiracy. As to my air, I am ready, without however recollecting it, to admit every appearance of trouble; for I was weighed down by the thought, and calamitous necessity, of shedding the blood of citizen by citizen.

Conscious, as I was, that upon the subject of money, nothing had passed between Mr. Fauchet and myself, which rendered me vulnerable; I was not dismayed by the inferences in his letter No. 10, from his dispatch No. 6. I confess, however, that I was almost intirely at a loss, to what they could allude; until, on the inspection of No. 6, I gathered from its short, abrupt, and incomplete statement, some leading ideas.

Mr. Fauchet connects, what he calls the overture in No. 6, with the narrative of the insurrection; and consequently a solution of it is to be looked for in that event. As to the request of a private conversation, I neither can, nor have I any solicitude, to charge my memory concerning it. Whensoever the secretary of state has gone to the house of a foreign minister, it has generally been a thing of course, that they should be alone. Our discourse

turned upon the insurrection, and upon the expected machinations of Mr. Hammond and others at New-York, against the French Republic, Governor Clinton, and myself. I spoke to you of this a few days at New-York, and of Mr. Fauchet's opinion, that they would concert something to the annoyance of France. Fresh as the intelligence was upon my mind, that the British were fomenting the insurrection, I was strongly inclined to believe, that Mr. Hammond's congress, as Mr. Fauchet denominated it, would not forego the opportunity of furnishing, to the utmost of their abilities, employment to the United States, and of detaching their attention and power from the European war. Of Mr. Hammond's individual efforts I could not entertain a doubt; he having declared, if I am not misinformed, that Mr. Jay's mission would be abortive; and his whole demeanor seeming to be regulated by the expectation, that no adjustment with Great Britain was at hand. I own therefore, that I was extremely desirous of learning, what was passing at New-York. Mr. Fauchet had given me a title to call upon him for proof of his complaints, that in the bosom of our country, in one of our most capital cities, combinations against the French cause were tolerated. Complaints of this kind had been a reiterated theme with him, and I could not neglect this, without subjecting myself to censure. I accordingly demanded his proofs; calculating, that if evidence was unattainable, I should silence future crimination of the United States; and if it was attainable, it might bring with it other intelligence, highly beneficial to the United States, in detecting and enabling them to counteract, the machinations in favour of the insurrection. I certainly thought, that those men, who were on an intimate footing with Mr. Fauchet, and had some access to the British connections, were the best fitted for obtaining this intelligence. I remembered, that he had applied to me for the names of men, qualified as contractors of flour in the different states; and this application can be proved by a paper in my possession, by two gentlemen in Philadelphia, and, I believe, by yourself, to

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whom I mentioned it. Whether I suggested them to be the proper correspondents on the occasion, or not, I shall not undertake to determine. But if I did, I had not the most distant idea of any names, or any number of persons; and if number was at all hinted at, it must have been in that indefinite way, which Mr. Fauchet states in his certificate.—What were to be the functions of these men? The dispatch No. 6, informs us, “*to save the country*” from a civil war; not to kindle one, as has been maliciously asserted. To every man, whose motives were pure; who panted for no pretexts to raise a military force; this object was dear indeed: The backwardness of some portions of the militia in marching, and the resignation of several officers were notorious; and when I broke to Mr. Bradford and other gentlemen, my fear of our being embroiled with the British, I aver their answer to have been, that, if the British could once be found to have meddled with the insurrection, the friends of the insurgents would abandon them, and the militia would step forth with alacrity. Of this I was absolutely persuaded myself.—It was easy to be foreseen, that every rigor, which could be exercised upon men, who should be known to be engaged in a work of this nature, would be exercised upon them by the British Faction; and that if from debt or any other cause they should happen to be in their power, mercy would be vainly expected. How I expressed myself in relation to this, if at all, I cannot now remember; for it was so much an affair of accidental occurrence to my mind, that until I saw No. 6, I could not, in the smallest degree, satisfy myself, how money came to be involved. Mr. Fauchet's letter indeed made me suppose, that No. 6 possibly alluded to some actual or proffered loan or expenditure, for the nourishment of the insurrection: and therefore I thought it necessary to deny, in my letter to you of the 19th of August, 1795, that one shilling was contemplated by me to be applied by Mr. Fauchet relative to the insurrection. I could only say, as I now repeat, that whatsoever might have passed, in which money was embraced, could only respect

the circumstances abovementioned. I appeal to God, as my witness, that the day after the conversation with Mr. Fauchet, I informed you of his having complained of machinations at New-York against his government: that he intimated others of a similar kind against the United States: that you asked me, why he did not bring proof of them? and that I replied, that I had insisted upon it being his duty to produce them by every exertion in his power. How much more I may have said to you, I do not recollect; but I withheld nothing from you, on an idea of impropriety in myself. To minute down the various conversations between you and myself, was impracticable: to recollect them all, and in their just extent, cannot be undertaken by either of us;—nay more, had I been so careful, as to preserve a memorial of this particular conversation, which, in the supposed money-part of it at least, made so small an impression upon me, I should be puzzled to assign a reason to myself for doing so.

What, if I had exhorted Mr. Fauchet thus: “Sir! you have been uttering your discontents to me concerning a conspiracy, carried on by the British in the United States against your government, and have insinuated, that it is extended even to our own. To prove that you are sincere, and are not indulging idle clamours; obtain the necessary intelligence. You can do it, although you should be obliged to protect your correspondents from British persecution, by the advances to be made to them, on the score of your flour-contracts.” Without examining the correctness or unfitness of this procedure; let me ask, if I was not warranted in the belief, that it would have been acceptable to you, to make the researches, which Mr. Fauchet was bound to institute in justice to his own country, the vehicle of information, useful to our own, touching the British movements? Yes, Sir; look at a certain letter, which you approved, on the 28th of July, 1794, in which the money of the United States was pledged, and every nerve was strained for this object;—look at another letter, which, though written on the 28th of

August, 1794, was discussed as early as the latter end of July; and directed a public officer to explore the temper of the counties, west of the Susquehanna, as to the insurrection:—remember another very confidential letter, which I was instructed by you to write, urging a particular person to explore the situation of the insurgents in all points. What my own zeal was on this distressing crisis, let my private letter to Mr. Bradford at Pittsburg, on the 16th of August, 1794, speak.—“ The attention of this city\* is occupied by the commotion in the west; and there seems to be but one horror at the attack on government. However, I pray you to close the business without bloodshed; and let the souls of our fellow-citizens be warned against some common enemy, rather than one another. Whatever eloquence, whatever influence our commissioners possess, let them pour it all most profusely forth, rather than suffer the sword to be drawn. I never reflect on the situation of the man, whom I venerate and love, that I do not curse those, who are endeavouring by their outrages on government, to drive him to an act, which he would avoid by any sacrifice of personal considerations. If the Rubicon is not passed by the insurgents, I trust, that you can stop them on this side;—if it is, I lament the dire necessity of appealing to arms.”

That the narrative of the conversation is mutilated, appears from the very face of the paper, which Mr. Adet affirms to contain the whole of what relates to the overture, as it is called. Naked as the representation is, it is incomprehensible in itself. What four men upon earth could have been contemplated? Why was *British* persecution to be apprehended? Why should so peculiar an interest be attributed to Mr. Fauchet, in saving the country from a civil war? No other explanation, than that which has been given, will suit the imperfect hints. Having already delivered my opinion to the President for the purpose of saving a civil war, no agency from me could accomplish any new effect.

\* Philadelphia.

I will here inquire from Mr. Hammond, and the British faction, which through him have been put in motion; from those, who for the sake of party, interest, or personality, have propagated falsehoods in every town; or who persevere in the hatred of a connection between the United States and France;—what is become of their base assertions, that tens and hundreds of thousand dollars have been received from the French minister? I demand of those, who have transmitted to every quarter of the union, in which they could find adherents, stories of large sums of French secret-service money being distributed in the United States, to exhibit their proof. Let them or the government go to the Bank of the United States, from whence the French minister received all the money which was paid to him by our treasury, or let them scrutinize elsewhere. Let every sum of importance be traced: let a reward be offered for every species of evidence: I challenge the whole world to support, by these or any other expedients, the charge of money or of an overture for money.

If candor ever dwelt in the breast of those, who have seized Mr. Fauchet's letter, as an instrument of party, or from their familiarity with corruption it has not deserted them, I must intreat them for a moment to obey the dictates of common sense. Nothing short of the most complete folly could have induced me to hint to Mr. Fauchet an overture of money for myself—1. It cannot be doubted, that if Mr. Fauchet had even *conjectured*, that I had presented myself for money, he would have been pointed. He would either have directly asserted it, or would have insinuated, that the measure of which I talked, was a cover to some proposition for my own benefit. He would have animadverted upon the circuitousness of my proceeding; and would probably have attempted to indicate, how my observations could have been brought round, so as to be applicable to myself. An omission like this, was too striking to a man, whose pen was rapidly flowing in the history of his access to of-

fical secrets.—2. There were official secrets, which might have been distantly, but plainly approached, and the value of which would have been more attractive to him, than the “*saving of the United States from a civil war.*” What would not have been his joy to inspect Mr. Jay’s instructions and letters? And yet you must be convinced, that he never saw or heard a syllable of them, without your permission.—3. A plan of corruption, which should engage the attention of a foreign minister, must pledge the person corrupted to execute the will of the foreign government. Read Mr. Fauchet’s letters in the department of state; read the anguish of his remonstrances; and then determine, if the most successful address to him for a mercenary purpose would not have been, to promise to labour for the removal of their cause.—4. I had often heard him vehement against the British practice of seduction, and extolling the purity of his own government. If this were not enough to deter a proposition for money; it would have been clothed in terms, which might decisively fix his notice.—5. You and I knew, Sir, officially his poverty; from his urgency to anticipate the debt, due to France, for the purchase of provisions.—6. You and I knew officially from the American minister, that two other persons were in commission with Mr. Fauchet. It was suspected, from a quarter in which I confided, that these persons were in a political intimacy with members of our government, not friendly to me. I knew officially, that money-claims and money advances were to be sanctioned by them as well as Mr. Fauchet. Is it possible, that ordinary prudence would not have forbidden this hazard, this certainty of detection?—7. It was predicted on Mr. Fauchet’s arrival, that on a revolution of the party, which sent him hither, he would be recalled. Was *this* the foreign minister, who was to be the depository of very high confidence?—8. You recollect, that Mr. Fauchet, upon learning that you meant to reside at Germantown during the summer of 1794, rented a house, as he told you, to have the pleasure of being near you: that without lodging a single night there, he suddenly re-

versed his determination ; paid his landlord a composition ; and sequestered himself in the country on the Schuylkill. No sooner was I acquainted with it than I observed to you, that Mr. Fauchet must have been abruptly alienated from the government. This therefore was not the season for confidential overtures ; and the strain of my public letters to him, which awakened his sensibility, manifested, that I felt myself beyond danger from his disclosures.—9. Would he have thought of answering me, by referring to “ the pure and unalterable principles of his Republic ;” would he have always admitted my integrity in his letters ; or would he have certified the conversation, as he has done, if I had condescended to accept a bribe ?—10. Do you believe, Sir, that if money was pursued by a secretary of state, he would have been rebuffed by an answer, which implied no refusal ; and would not have renewed the proposition ; which however Mr. Fauchet confesses, that he never heard of again.

But why, (it may be asked,) if his impressions were not very forcible, has he made such forcible inferences ?—When he wrote his letter on the 31st of October 1794, his irritation against the government had increased ; and his political speculations went to vilify the system of finance, and to bend every event to his opinions. How else can we account for a civil war, which was then existing, being decided or not, according to the statement in No. 6 ?—Where is the tariff, as if a sum was marked out ?—His impressions may have been what they will : I deny them, if they be coupled with any thing dishonorable. He admits, that he was mistaken. No. 6 itself demonstrates, that he did not comprehend the transaction ; and his solution of his error from the use of the French and English language at different times, will be frankly allowed by those, who have been circumstanced, as Mr. Fauchet was.

If a foreign minister, known to be disgusted with the government, and a particular officer ; anxious to approve himself as vigilant, penetrating, and influential ; im-

perfectly understanding what is said to him ; *conjecturing* things to be facts, many of which are, within the knowledge of yourself and others, unfounded ; collecting from the newspapers slates of politics ; secluding himself from the world, where his information might be chaffized ; drawing erroneous consequences from his own data :— if he is to be immediately and continually quoted in opposition to his own certificate, and the tenor of his own dispatches, to the disadvantage of that officer ;—then may any foreign minister destroy, whom he pleases : then may Mr. Hammond, and those who resemble him, destroy any officer, not devoted to Great Britain. What more can be expected from me ?

*The seventeenth paragraph.*

“ 17. As soon as it was decided that the French Republic purchased no men to do their duty, there were to be seen individuals, about whose conduct the government could at least form uneasy conjectures, giving themselves up with a scandalous ostentation to its views, and even seconding its declarations. The Popular Societies soon emitted resolutions stamped with the same spirit, and who although they may have been advised by love of order, might nevertheless have omitted or uttered them with less solemnity. Then were seen coming from the very men whom we had been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the system of the treasurer, harangues without end, in order to give a new direction to the public mind. The militia, however, manifest some repugnance, particularly in Pennsylvania, for the service to which they were called. Several officers resign ; at last by excursions or harangues, incomplete requisitions are obtained, and scattered volunteer corps from different parts make up the deficiency. How much more interesting, than the changeable men whom I have painted above, were those plain citizens who answered the solicitations which were made to them to join the volunteers—“ If we are required we will march ; because we do not wish not to have a government, but to arm ourselves as volunteers would be in appearance subscribing implicitly to the excise system which we reprobate.”

Although in the first line of this paragraph, M. Fauchet continues the spirit of the deductions, which he had made the minute before; yet does it manifest, that, when he wrote his letter, he did not conceive me to be personally concerned in the overture, as he terms it. For what were men to be procured? To do *their* duty. What was their duty? To save their country from a civil war. If it be objected, that *his decision*, which appears from No. 6. never to have been communicated to me, was notwithstanding guessed at and intimated to any individuals whatsoever; I assert, that nothing can be more remote from truth.

*The eighteenth paragraph.*

18. What I have said above, authorises then our resting on the opinion become incontrovertible, that in the crisis which has burst, and in the means employed for restoring order, the true question was the destruction or the triumph of the treasurer's plans. This being once established, let us pass over the facts related in the common dispatches, and see how the government or the treasurer will take from the very stroke which threatened his system the safe opportunity of humbling the adverse party, and of silencing their enemies whether open or concealed. The army marched; the President made known that he was going to command it; he sat out for Carlisle; Hamilton, as I have understood, requested to follow him; the President dared not to refuse him. It does not require much penetration to divine the object of this journey: In the President it was wise, it might also be his duty. But in Mr. Hamilton it was a consequence of the profound policy which directs all his steps; a measure dictated by a perfect knowledge of the human heart. Was it not interesting for him, for his party, tottering under the weight of events without and accusations within, to proclaim an intimacy more perfect than ever with the President, whose very name is a sufficient shield against the most formidable attacks? Now what more evident mark could the President give of his intimacy than by suffering Mr. Hamilton, whose name even is understood in the west as that of a public enemy, to go and place himself at the head of the army which went, if I may use the expression, to cause his system to triumph against the opposition of the people? The presence of Mr. Hamilton with the army must attach it more than ever to his party; we see what ideas these circumstances give birth to on both sides, all however to the advantage of the secretary.

This paragraph scarcely requires a comment from me. It is observable, however, that, as Mr. Fauchet returns to subjects, upon which he communicated with his colleagues, they were, according to his observation at the beginning of his letter, intirely distinct from any secrets of our government. When he speaks of *his having learned*,

that Mr. Hamilton requested to follow the President, I am not quoted; though I shall freely declare, how I may have contributed to the report, which he might have possibly heard from his colleagues through the connections, which they had formed, both in and out of the government. You will remember, Sir, that I represented to you, how much Col. Hamilton's accompanying you was talked of out of doors, and how much stress was laid upon the seeming necessity of the commander in chief having him always at his elbow. You acquainted me with his request to attend you, and I understood, that I was at liberty to say so, wheresoever I should find an occasion. I think it probable therefore, that I mentioned the fact, to shew to the world, that Col. Hamilton had not been solicited by you to follow him, and thus to counteract the idea of your absolute dependance on his counsels. But I neither recollect nor believe, that any thing passed from myself to Mr. Fauchet. That the President dared not to refuse Mr. Hamilton is plainly Mr. Fauchet's own remark.

*The nineteenth paragraph.*

19. Three weeks had they encamped in the west without a single armed man appearing. However the President, or those who wished to make the most of this new manœuvre, made it public that he was going to command in person. The session of Congress being very near, it was wished to try whether there could not be obtained from the presses, which were supposed to have changed, a silence, whence to conclude the possibility of infringing the constitution in its most essential part; in that which fixes the relation of the President with the legislature. But the patriotic papers laid hold of this artful attempt: I am certain that the office of the secretary of state, which alone remained at Philadelphia, (for while the minister of finance was with the army, the minister of war was on a tour to the Province of Maine, 400 miles from Philadelphia), maintained the controversy in favour of the opinion which it was desired to establish. A comparison between the President and the English monarch was introduced, who far removed from Westminster, yet strictly fulfils his duty of sanctioning; it was much insisted on that the constitution declares that the President commands the armed force: this similitude was treated with contempt; the consequence of the power of commanding in person, drawn from the right to command in chief (or direct) the force of the state, was ridiculed and reduced to an absurdity, by supposing a fleet at sea and an army on land. The result of this controversy was, that some days after it was announced that the President would come to open the approaching session.

I discover nothing in this paragraph demanding an answer from me ; except that with my privity or belief, not a single publication was made from the department of state, respecting the President's absence from congress.

*The twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth paragraphs.*

20. During his stay at Bedford, the President doubtless concerted the plan of the campaign with Mr. Lee, to whom he left the command in chief. The letter by which he delegates the command to him, is that of a virtuous man, at least as to the major part of the sentiments which it contains ; he afterwards set out for Philadelphia, where he has just arrived, and Mr. Hamilton remains with the army.

21. This last circumstance unveils all the plan of the Secretary : he presides over the military operations in order to acquire in the sight of his enemies a formidable and imposing consideration. He and Mr. Lee the commander in chief, agree perfectly in principles. The governors of Jersey and Maryland harmonize entirely with them ; the governor of Pennsylvania, of whom it never would have been suspected, lived intimately and publicly with Hamilton. Such a union of persons would be matter sufficient to produce resistance in the western counties, even admitting they had not thought of making any.

22. The soldiers themselves are astonished at the scandalous gaiety, with which those who possess the secret, proclaim their approaching triumph. It is asked, of what use are 15,000 men in this country, in which provisions are scarce, and where are to be seized only some turbulent men at their plough. Those who conducted the expedition know this ; the matter is to create a great expence ; when the sums shall come to be assessed, no one will be willing to pay, and should each pay his assessment, it will be done in cursing the insurgent principles of the patriots.

23. It is impossible to make a more able manœuvre for the opening of Congress. The passions, the generous indignation, which had agitated their minds in the last session, were about being renewed with still more vigor ; there was nothing to announce of brilliant successes which they had promised. The hostilities of Great Britain on the continent so long disguised, and now become evident, a commerce always harrassed, ridiculous negociations lingering at London, waiting until new conjunctures should authorize new insults : such was the picture they were likely to have to offer the representatives of the people. But this crisis, and the great movements made to prevent its consequences, change the state of things. With what advantage do they denounce an atrocious attack upon the constitution, and appreciate the activity used to repress it ; the aristocratical party will soon have understood the secret ; all the misfortunes will be attributed to patriots ; the party of the latter is about being deserted by all the weak men, and this complete fession will have been gained.

24. Who knows what will be the limits of this triumph ? Perhaps advantage will be taken by it to obtain some laws for strengthening the government, and still more precipitating the propensity, already visible, that it has towards aristocracy.

25. Such are, citizen, the data which I possess concerning these events, and the consequences I draw from them : I wish I may be deceiver.

ed in my calculations, and the good disposition of the people; their attachment to principles leads me to expect it. I have perhaps herein fallen into the repetition of reflections and facts contained in other dispatches, but I wished to present together some views which I have reason to ascribe to the ruling party, and some able manœuvres invented to support themselves. Without participating in the passions of the parties, I observe them; and I owe to my country an exact and strict account of the situation of things. I shall make it my duty to keep you regularly informed of every change that may take place; above all I shall apply myself to penetrate the disposition of the legislature; that will not a little assist in forming the final idea which we ought to have of these movements, and what we should really fear or hope from them.

Upon these paragraphs I shall observe, only that it was impossible for me on the faith of Mr. Jay's letters to pronounce, that the negotiations in London were derisory or ridiculous.

Thus, Sir, have I analyzed Mr. Fauchet's letter No. 10, and his dispatches No. 3 and 6. But it is my right, from a just sense of injury, to call the attention of the people and yourself to some further observations.

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In this letter, Sir, I appeal to the people of the United States. They have not committed themselves. They have no prejudices, no antipathies, no jealousies to be awakened. They will follow counsellors, who will not, and cannot deceive them: who will act for themselves, and are not played off by others behind the scene. They will be able to repel the crisis, which, I fear, may disturb our harmony with France. But without a farther enumeration of reasons for an appeal to the people, to whom else ought I to appeal? If the stories, which have been propagated, be true; it is *their* honor, which has been wounded. If false, they alone can make retribution to me. On them alone can I rely to distinguish truth from the management and exaggerations of a British minister, British partisans, British merchants, enemies of France, friends of monarchy, and violators of our constitution.

To yourself, Sir, I never can appeal. Your conduct on the 19th of August 1795, your letter of the 20th;

and the declarations of those, who felt a persuasion, that they were fighting under your banners, have long ago proclaimed, that you had been in an instant transformed into my enemy: And this, if I mistake not, was the course of your thoughts. After you had determined not to ratify during the existence of the provision order, you were surrounded by the remonstrances of the people from one end of the union to the other. You perceived, that not to ratify immediately, would disgust one party, and that to ratify, even after the abolition of that order, would disgust the other. You will remember a remarkable phrase of your own upon this occasion. Before, however, you were scarcely cool from the heat of your journey from Virginia, the man, who had been anxiously inquiring after your arrival, hastened to deliver the letter to you. Then the friendship of the people for France, which had been before a terror, was changed into a phantom, from the expectation of satisfying them of an existing corruption in her favour. Then the opposers of the treaty might, as was supposed, be branded, as a "detestable faction"—"a detestable conspiracy"—and plotters of a revolution. The destruction of me was a little something;—the groundwork of a more important assault upon others. In me you saw a man of no party;—whose friends, though they knew me to be republican, were misled to believe, that in your cabinet I was an adherent to anti-republican measures, and were ignorant, that no opinion, which I there gave, ever swerved from the rights of the people:—who, having the name of being befriended by you, and having always vindicated your character, when unjustly assailed, was the more exposed to a deadly stroke from the arm of an elevated and reputed patron. You thought also, that from the agency, which I had had in the treaty, the people might keep aloof from rendering me justice. Be this as it may, they shall be informed of the truth; and I repeat, that I will not court the prejudices of any man upon earth.

I did indeed, before the provision-order was known, consider you, as bound to ratify, if the senate should advise you; because your powers to Mr. Jay did not seem to have been exceeded. I was much influenced also by these considerations. 1. That if the people were

adverse to the treaty, it was the constitutional right of the house of representatives to refuse, upon original grounds, unfettered by the assent of the senate or yourself, to pass the laws, necessary for its execution :—2. That Mr. Jay had asserted that no better terms could possibly be obtained; and that obstinacy in rejecting the settlement, which he had made, might be serious :—3. That I did not then suppose, that we were to hazard a war with France, by concurring in the attempt to starve her. But as soon as the provision-order was promulgated, I delivered to you my opinion on the 12th of July 1795; in which I stated my objections to the treaty, including many of your own, transmitted to Mr. Jay in my letters of the 12th of November, and 15th of December 1794; placing the ratification on the same footing, on which I had placed it in my address to Mr. Hammond.

Without a subserviency to French politics, I might have well doubted of the expediency of ratifying, when it appears by a letter from Mr. Jay, of the 5th of November 1794 (fourteen days before he signed it) that he himself vibrated on the propriety of signing it. The maxim, which I have always enforced to you, has been, that the United States should shake off all dependence of French and English interference in our affairs: but that we ought not to deny or baffle the gratitude of the people to France under the pretext of independence, in order to give a decisive preponderance to Great Britain.

Anxious as I am to close this letter which has been delayed, not from any design, or hesitation, but from circumstances, unavoidable in my situation; I have only to deplore, that even with an anxiety on your part to recollect every thing, I cannot hope for support in many things, which I might mention, and which have been confined to ourselves; after having heard you daily complain, that you could not trust your memory. But having been driven by self defence to speak freely, I stand upon the truth of what I have spoken:—LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE.

I have the honour, Sir,  
to be with due respect,  
your most obedient servant,

EDM. RANDOLPH.

# A P P E N D I X.

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## N<sup>o</sup>. I.

### *MESSAGE of the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES, to CONGRESS.*

" UNITED STATES, December 5, 1793.

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE,  
and of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

" AS the present situation of the several nations of Europe, and especially of those with which the United States have important relations, cannot but render the state of things between them and us, matter of interesting inquiry, to the legislature, and may, indeed, give rise to deliberations, to which they alone are competent, I have thought it my duty to communicate to them, certain correspondences which have taken place.

The representative and executive bodies of France have manifested, generally, a friendly attachment to this country; have given advantages to our commerce and navigation, and have made overtures for placing these advantages on permanent ground; a decree, however, of the National Assembly, subjecting vessels laden with provisions, to be carried into their ports, and making enemy-goods lawful prize, in the vessel of a friend, contrary to our treaty, though revoked at one time, as to the United States, has been since extended to their vessels also, as has been recently stated to us:—Representations on this subject will be immediately given in charge to our minister there, and the result shall be communicated to the legislature.

It is, with extreme concern, I have to inform you, that the proceedings of the person, whom they have unfortunately appointed their minister plenipotentiary here, have breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent him; their tendency, on the contrary, has been to involve us in war abroad, and discord and anarchy at home. So far as his acts, or those of his agents, have threatened our immediate commitment in the war, or flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been counteracted by the ordinary cognizance of the laws, and by an exertion of the powers confided to me. Where their danger was not imminent, they have been borne with, from sentiments of regard to his nation; from a sense of their friendship towards us; from a conviction, that they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the action of a person, who has so little respected our mutual dispositions; and, I will add, from a reliance on the firmness of my fellow-citizens, in their principles of peace and order. In the mean time I have respected and pursued the stipulations of our treaties, according to what I judged their true sense; and have withheld no act of friendship, which their affairs have called for from us, and which justice to others left us free to perform—I have gone further.—Rather than employ force for the restitution of certain vessels, which I deemed the United States bound to restore, I thought it more advisable to satisfy the parties, by avowing it to be my opinion, that if restitution were not made, it would be incumbent on the United States to make compensation. The papers now communicated will more particularly apprise you of these transactions.

The vexations and spoliation, understood to have been committed on our vessels and commerce, by the cruisers and officers of some of the belligerent powers, appeared to

require attention. The proofs of these, however, not having been brought forward, the description of citizens supposed to have suffered, were notified, that on furnishing them to the executive, due measures would be taken to obtain redress of the past, and more effectual provisions against the future. Should such documents be furnished, proper representations will be made thereon, with a just reliance on a redress proportioned to the exigency of the case.

The British government having undertaken, by orders to the commanders of their armed vessels, to restrain, generally, our commerce, in corn and other provisions, to their own ports, and those of their friends, the instructions now communicated were immediately forwarded to our minister at that court. In the mean time, some discussions on the subject took place between him and them; these are also laid before you; and I may expect to learn the result of his special instructions, in time to make it known to the legislature, during their present session.

Very early after the arrival of a British minister here, mutual explanations on the inexecution of the treaty of peace were entered into, with that minister: these are now laid before you, for your information.

On the subjects of mutual interest between this country and Spain, negotiations and conferences are now depending. The public good requiring that the present state of these should be made known to the legislature, *in confidence only*, they shall be the subject of a separate and subsequent communication.

G<sup>o</sup>. WASHINGTON.

## N<sup>o</sup>. II.

### *Message of the President to the Senate, nominating Mr. Jay.*

April 16th, 1794.

GENTLEMEN of the Senate,—The communications which I have made to you during your present Session, from the dispatches of our Minister in London, contain a serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain. But as *Peace* ought to be pursued with unremitting zeal, before the last resource, which has so often been the scourge of nations, and cannot fail to check the advanced prosperity of the United States, is contemplated, I have thought proper to nominate and do hereby nominate JOHN JAY, as Envoy Extraordinary of the United States, to his Britannic Majesty. My confidence in our Minister Plenipotentiary in London, continues undiminished; but a mission like this, while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for a friendly adjustment of our complaints, and a reluctance to hostility. Going immediately from the United States, such an Envoy will carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility of our country; and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness, and to cultivate *peace* with sincerity.

## N<sup>o</sup>. III.

### *Edmund Randolph to the President.*

PHILADELPHIA 5th August, 1794.

SIR,

THE late events in the neighbourhood of Pittsburg appeared, on the first intelligence of them, to be extensive in their relations. But subsequent reflection, and the conference with the Governor of Pennsylvania have multiplied them in my mind tenfold. Indeed, Sir, the moment is big with a crisis, which would convulse the eldest government; and if it should burst on ours, its extent and dominion can be but faintly conjectured.

At our first consultation, in your presence, the indignation, which we all felt, at the outrages committed, created a desire, that the information received should be laid before an associate justice, or the district judge; to be considered under the act of May 2d, 1792. This step was urged by the necessity of understanding, without delay, all the means vested in the President, for suppressing the progress of the mischief. A caution, however, was prescribed to the Attorney General, who submitted the documents to the Judge, not to express the most distant wish of the President that the certificate should be granted.

The certificate has been granted; and although the testimony is not in my judgment, yet in sufficient legal form to become the ground work of such an act; and a judge ought not *a priori* to decide that the Marshal is incompetent to suppress the combinations by the *posse comitatus*, yet the certificate, if it be minute enough, is conclusive, that, "in the counties of Washington and Allegany in Pennsylvania, laws of the United States are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshal of that district." But the certificate specifies no particular law which has been opposed. This defect I remarked to Judge Wilson, from whom the certificate came, and observed that the design of the law being, that a judge should point out to the executive where the judiciary stood in need of military aid, it was frustrated if military force should be applied to laws, which the judge might not contemplate. He did not yield to my reasoning; and therefore I presume that the objection will not be received against the validity of the certificate.

Upon the supposition of its being valid a power arises to the President to call forth the militia of Pennsylvania, and eventually the militia of other states, which may be convenient. But as the law does not compel the President to array the militia in consequence of the certificate, and renders it lawful only for him so to do; the grand enquiry is, whether it be expedient to exercise this power at this time.

On many occasions have I contended; that whenever military coercion is to be resorted to in support of law, the militia are the true, proper, and only instruments which ought to be employed. But a calm survey of the situation of the United States has presented these dangers, and these objections, and banishes every idea of calling them into immediate action:

1. A radical and universal dissatisfaction with the excise pervades the four transmontane counties of Pennsylvania, having more than sixty three thousand souls in the whole, and more than fifteen thousand white males above the age of sixteen. The counties on the eastern side of the mountain, and some other populous counties, are infected by similar prejudices, inferior in degree, and dormant, but not extinguished.

2. Several counties in Virginia, having a strong militia, participate in these feelings.

3. The insurgents themselves, numerous, are more closely united by like dangers, with friends and kindred, scattered abroad in different places, who will enter into all the apprehensions, and combine in all the precautions of safety, adopted by them.

4. As soon, too, as any event of eclat shall occur, around which persons, discontented on other principles, whether of aversion to the government or disgust with any measures of the administration, may rally, they will make a common cause.

5. The Governor of Pennsylvania has declared his opinion to be, that the militia, which can be drawn forth, will be unequal to the task.

6. If the militia of other states are to be called forth, it is not a decided thing, that many of them may not refuse. And if they comply, is nothing to be apprehended from a strong cement growing between all the militia of Pennsylvania, when they perceive, that, another militia is to be introduced into the bosom of their country? The experiment is at least untried.

7. The expence of a military expedition will be very great; and with a devouring Indian war, the commencement of a navy, the sum to be expended for obtaining a peace with Algiers, the destruction of our mercantile capital by British depredations, the uncertainty of war or peace with Great Britain, the impatience of the people under increased taxes, the punctual support of our credit;—it behoves those, who manage our fiscal matters to be sure of their pecuniary resources, when so great a field of new and unexpected expence is to be opened.

8. Is there any appropriation of money, which can be immediately devoted to this use? If not how can money be drawn? It is said that appropriations are to the War department generally; but it may deserve enquiry, whether they were not made upon particular statements of a kind of service, essentially distinct from the one proposed.

9. If the intelligence of the overtures of the British to the Western counties be true, and the inhabitants should be driven to accept their aid, the supplies of the western army, —the western army itself may be destroyed ; the re-union of that country to the United States will be impracticable ; and we must be engaged in a British war. If the intelligence be probable only—, how difficult will it be to reconcile the world to believe, that we have been consistent in our conduct ; when, after running the hazard of mortally offending the French by the punctilious observance of neutrality ; after deprecating the wrath of the English by every possible act of government ; after the request for the suspension of the settlement at Pres ue Isle, which has in some measure been founded on the possibility of Great Britain being roused to arms by it ; we pursue measures, which threaten collision with Great Britain and which are mixed with the blood of our fellow-citizens.

10. If miscarriage should befall the United States in the beginning, what may not be the consequence ? And if this should not happen, is it possible to foresee what may be the effect of ten, twenty, or thirty thousand of our citizens being drawn into the field against as many more. There is another enemy in the heart of the Southern states, who would not sleep with such an opportunity of advantage.

11. It is a fact well known that the parties in the United States are highly inflamed against each other ; and that there is but one character which keeps both in awe. As soon as the sword shall be drawn\*—to restrain them.

On this subject the souls of some good men bleed : They have often asked themselves why they are always so jealous of military power, whenever it has been proposed to be exercised under the form of a succour to the civil authority ? How has it happened that with a temper, not addicted to suspicion, nor unfriendly to those who propose military force, they do not court the shining reputation which is acquired by being always ready for strong measures. This is the reason ; that they are confident that they know the ultimate sense of the people ; that the will of the people must force its way in the government ; that, notwithstanding the indignation which may be raised against the insurgents ; yet if measures, unnecessarily harsh, disproportionately harsh, and without a previous trial of every thing, which law or the spirit of conciliation can do, be executed, that indignation will give way, and the people will be estranged from the administration which made the experiment. There is a second reason ; one motive assigned in argument for calling forth the militia, has been, that a government can never be said to be established, until some signal display has manifested its power of military coercion. This maxim, if indulged, would heap curses upon the government. The strength of a government is the affection of the people ; and while that is maintained, every invader, every insurgent, will as certainly count upon the fear of its strength, as if it had with one army of citizens mown down another.

Let the parties in the United States be ever kindled into action, sentiments like these will produce a flame, which will not terminate in a common revolution.

Knowing, Sir, as I do, the motives, which govern you in office, I was certain that you would be anxious to mitigate as far as you thought it practicable, the military course which has been recommended. You have accordingly suspended the force of the preceding observations, by determining not to call forth the militia immediately to action, and to send commissioners, who may explain and adjust if possible the present discontented.

The next question then is, whether the militia shall be directed to hold themselves in readiness ; or shall not be summoned at all ?

It has been supposed by some gentlemen, that when reconciliation is offered with one hand, terror should be borne in the other ; and that a full amnesty and oblivion shall not be granted, unless the excise laws be complied with in the fullest manner.

With a language such as this, the overtures of peace will be considered delusive by the insurgents and the most of the world. It will be said and believed, that the design of sending commissioners was only to gloom over hostility ; to endeavour to divide ; to sound the strength of the insurgents ; to discover the most culpable persons, to be marked out for punishment ; to temporize until Congress can be prevailed upon to order further force, or the western army may be at leisure from the savages, to be turned upon the insurgents ; and many other suspicions will be entertained which cannot be here enumerated. When Congress talked of some high handed steps against Great Britain, they were disapproved, as countering Mr. Jay's mission ; because it could not be expected, they would be dragooned. Human nature will to a certain point shew itself to be the same, even among the Alleghany mountains. The mission will, I fear, fail ; though it would be to me the most grateful occurrence in life to find my prediction falsified. If it does

\* There is a blank in this place in the copy preserved.

fail, and in consequence of the disappointment the militia should be required to act, then will return that fatal train of events, which I have stated above, to be suspended, for the present.

What would be the inconvenience of delay? The result of the mission would be known in four weeks, and the President would be master of his measures, without any previous commitment. Four weeks could not render the insurgents more formidable: that space of time might render them less so, by affording room for reflection: and the government will have a sufficient season remaining to act. Until every peaceable attempt shall be exhausted, it is not clear to me, that as soon as the call is made, and the proclamation issued, the militia may not enter into some combination, which will satisfy the insurgents, that they need fear nothing from them, and spread those combinations among the militia.

My opinion therefore is, that the commissioners will be furnished with enough on the score of terror, when they announce, that the President is in possession of the certificate of the judge. It will confirm the humanity of the mission; and notwithstanding some men might pay encomiums on decision, vigor of nerves, &c. &c. if the militia were summoned to be held in readiness; the majority would conceive the merit of the mission incomplete if this were to be done.

It will not, however, be supposed, that I mean that these outrages are to pass without animadversion. No, Sir. That the authority of government is to be maintained is not less my position, than that of others. But I prefer the accomplishment of this by every experiment of moderation in the first instance. The steps, therefore, which I would recommend, are,

1. A serious proclamation, stating the mischief, declaring the power, possessed by the executive, and announcing, that it is withheld from motives of humanity and a wish for conciliation.

2. Commissioners, properly instructed to the same objects.

3. If they fail in their mission let the offenders be prosecuted according to law.

4. If the judiciary authority is, after this, withheld, let the militia be called out.

These appear to me to be the only means for producing unanimity in the people; and without their unanimity government may be mortified and defeated.

If the President shall determine to operate with the militia, it will be necessary to submit some animadversions upon the interpretation of the law. For it ought closely to be considered, whether if the combinations should disperse, the execution of process is not to be left to the Marshal and his *posse*. But these will be deferred, until orders shall be discussed for the militia to march.

I have the honor, Sir, to be

with the highest respect, and sincerest attachment,

Your most obedient servant,

EDM: RANDOLPH.

The President of the United States.

F I N I S.



